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https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004367312707
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Cite Journal: Journal of Philosophical Logic |  Publication Date: Jun 1, 1999 |
 Citations: 1 |
Affiliation: Northern Arizona University
A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed.
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