Abstract

Individuals often form more reasonable judgments from complex information after a period of distraction vs. deliberation. This phenomenon has been attributed to sophisticated unconscious thought during the distraction period that integrates and organizes the information (Unconscious Thought Theory; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Yet, other research suggests that experiential processes are strengthened during the distraction (relative to deliberation) period, accounting for the judgment and decision benefit. We tested between these possibilities, hypothesizing that unconscious thought is distinct from experiential processes, and independently contributes to judgments and decisions during a distraction period. Using an established paradigm, Experiment 1 (N = 319) randomly induced participants into an experiential or rational mindset, after which participants received complex information describing three roommates to then consider consciously (i.e., deliberation) or unconsciously (i.e., distraction). Results revealed superior roommate judgments (but not choices) following distraction vs. deliberation, consistent with Unconscious Thought Theory. Mindset did not have an influence on roommate judgments. However, planned tests revealed a significant advantage of distraction only within the rational-mindset condition, which is contrary to the idea that experiential processing alone facilitates complex decision-making during periods of distraction. In a second experiment (N = 136), we tested whether effects of unconscious thought manifest for a complex analytical reasoning task for which experiential processing would offer no advantage. As predicted, participants in an unconscious thought condition outperformed participants in a control condition, suggesting that unconscious thought can be analytical. In sum, the current results support the existence of unconscious thinking processes that are distinct from experiential processes, and can be rational. Thus, the experiential vs. rational nature of a process might not cleanly delineate conscious and unconscious thought.

Highlights

  • People can rely on a variety of processes to guide their decisions and judgments regarding complex information

  • This benefit is presumed to result from goal-directed unconscious thought occurring during the distraction period (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006)

  • It has been suggested the observed benefit from distraction is not due to unconscious thinking per se but instead to the emotionbased experiential system, which is presumably strengthened during a period of distraction

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Summary

Introduction

People can rely on a variety of processes to guide their decisions and judgments regarding complex information. Many dual-process models in psychology propose that judgments and decisions can predominantly result from either analytical or Unconscious Thought Can Be Rational experiential/emotional processing systems (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; see Evans, 2008 for review). Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994, 1998) describes two parallel informationprocessing systems – an experiential system and a rational system – that contribute to judgments and decisions. These two systems are global aspects of personality, and within each system are psychological processes. An individual with a relatively dominant experiential system may make judgments and decisions based on a “vibe” or hunch, paying close attention to his or her emotions, whereas an individual with a more dominant rational system may follow rules and careful analysis to reach a decision

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