Abstract

Since the end of the Korean war in 1953, North Korea has made considerable progress in a sustained effort to improve its international position. Though the Republic of Korea still maintains diplomatic relations with well over twice as many states as does the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang has moved up rapidly in the past two years, establishing relations with ten additional states since the beginning of 1963. The North Koreans have been most active in Africa and Asia-meeting comparatively light resistance from Seoul's thinly spread representatives. North Korea's stature in the non-Communist world has been enhanced by its relatively position within the Communist world and by its remarkable recovery from the destruction of the Korean war. The overriding aim of North Korean foreign policy has been the undercutting of the existing South Korean government and the eventual reunification of Korea under a Communist government. The major obstacle preventing the attainment of these goals has been the United States. North Korean unification proposals have stressed the benefits to be received by the south in any unification arrangement, the steady economic progress made by the independent north and the misery, poverty and unemployment resulting from domination of the South Korean government. Pyongyang has denied that the United Nations has any role to play in unification and insists that unification is a domestic affair to be settled without foreign interference and only after U.S. troops are withdrawn. North Korean propaganda-coupled with South Korean economic difficulties-has resulted in a significant upsurge in interest in unification in the south in the past two years and some South Koreans apparently favor a unification program which excludes the United Nations.' A large majority, however, are not prepared to accept unification on North Korean terms. The North Korean leadership today maintains a position of relative independence that would have been impossible ten years ago. There are no foreign troops, either Chinese or Soviet, inside North Korea in a position to act as a restraining influence on North Korean decision-making. North Korean economic development was sufficient to enable Pyongyang to adopt a pro-Chinese political line which resulted in a significant cut in Soviet

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