Non-state actors and environmental governance: comparing multinational, supranational and transnational rule making

Abstract

Many observers view the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, as the event that heralded the active involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international policy making. In the intervening years, NGO participation in international policy making has grown exponentially, as has the number of multilateral environmental conventions, global environmental conferences and other efforts to facilitate a global governance of the human environment. The increasing numbers of NGOs with a stake in global environmental politics has been well documented, as has the presence at multilateral negotiations and their influence on negotiation outcomes (Betsill and Corell 2008). This paper examines the role and influence of non-state actors (NSAs) in multinational, supranational and transnational policy making. We have selected three models of rulemaking to help explain the role and influence of NSAs in different governance systems, reflecting developments within global environmental governance over the past three decades. Whereas multinational cooperation remained the model of choice whenever international environmental rules were created until the 1980s, the model has been joined in recent years by supranational and transnational rulemaking models. We begin by briefly reviewing the three models before presenting three case studies. In the first we examine how NSAs brought their influence to bear in a particular case of multinational environmental negotiations: the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This should shed light on some of the conditions that allow NGOs to exert such a high degree of influence in multinational policy-making processes. Next we explore the role and influence of NSAs in the making of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS). This is a prime example of supranational policy making, and serves to demonstrate the complexity of assessing the influence of NSAs in a dense institutional context. Focusing on social and environmental certification programs, the third case examines a growing tendency for NSAs to act as transnational rule makers in policy areas where states have been unwilling or unable to provide governance. Three Models of Rule Making and the Role of Non-State Actors In multinational cooperation, here represented by the IWC, member states enjoy in principle full authority. The legitimacy of rule-making is ensured by consent between sovereign states based on international law. In this liberal intergovernmental rule-making model, NSAs belong to the set of domestic special interest organizations with sufficient clout to influence negotiating positions. Of course, their efforts to influence negotiation positions meet with varying success; nation-states always have the final word. In supranational cooperation, in this paper represented by the EU ETS scheme, nationstates have transferred some of their sovereignty to other actors. In the EU case, this is most visible is the rules on qualified majority voting, co-decision making by the European Parliament and the policy-initiating role of the Commission. In short, as the consent of a state in itself is sometimes wanting in terms of legitimacy, there need additional sources of