Abstract
Abstract Moral nonnaturalism’s animating idea is that moral reality has its own distinctive character, being autonomous vis-à-vis stretches of the natural world. Following G. E. Moore, many metaethicists have explicated this idea by reference to the province of natural science. Seeking to improve upon that Moorean approach, this chapter fleshes out nonnaturalism’s animating idea in essentialist terms: according to nonnaturalism, normativity figures ineliminably in the essence of at least some elements of moral reality. Otherwise put, moral reality is “deeply normative.” This nonnaturalist thesis can be paired with the distinct claim that normativity also figures ineliminably in the essence of at least some elements of non-moral reality—a view this chapter calls ‘Enchantment.’ The aim of this chapter is to present and elucidate both moral nonnaturalism and enchantment, defending its formulation of the former view: the formulation properly classifies paradigm naturalist and nonnaturalist positions, makes sense of various disputes between them, and distinguishes them in a way that is neither arbitrary nor stipulative, but philosophically substantive.
Published Version
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