Noncooperative Social Welfare Optimization With Resiliency Against Network Anomaly

Abstract

This article presents a noncooperative game-theoretic framework to model the social welfare optimization (SWO) problem with load aggregators participating in integrated economic dispatch and demand response. In the proposed framework, distribution system operators interact with generation units and load aggregators to maximize the overall social welfare. The proposed SWO problem addresses practical system constraints and falls into the scope of mixed integer nonlinear programs, which cannot be well handled by existing distributed algorithms. The proposed SWO problem is formulated by a special noncooperative strategic game, known as the potential game, and solved by a revised version of the spatial adaptive play under network anomaly. It is shown that the proposed framework has guaranteed convergence to a Nash equilibrium that is also a global optimizer. Simulations on a 15-generator benchmark distribution network have been conducted to validate the proposed framework.