Noncooperative Distributed Social Welfare Optimization with EV Charging Response

Abstract

This paper presents a novel non-cooperative strategic game-theoretic framework to model electric vehicle (EV) aggregators (such as fast-charging stations and aggregated building charging infrastructures) and enable their participation in integrated economic dispatch and demand response, as known as social welfare optimization. Each EV aggregator acts as a selfish and independent player with focus on only its own benefits. A special type of non-cooperative strategic game, called potential game, is applied to model the interaction between all palyers. Spatial adaptive play (SAP) is applied to for the players to learn and react in the proposed game, with guaranteed convergence to a Nash equilibrium (NE) which is also a global optimizer to the social welfare optimization problem. Simulations on a IS-bus IEEE network have been conducted to validate the framework. Results match expected outcomes and dynamics of the proposed EV charzina response 2ame.