Nonconceptualism as the key to a new physicalist strategy in the knowledge argument

Abstract

This paper presents and defends an alternative version to the so-called strategy of phenomenal concepts (aka PCS) in defense of type B materialism in Jackson’s knowledge argument. Endorsing Ball and Tye’s criticism, I argue in favor of the following claims. First: Mary’s newly acquired content is nonconceptual in the light of all available criteria. Second: Mary’s acquisition of such content is precisely what allows us to explain, at least in part, both her epistemic progress (once released from her confinement) and the increase in her expertize regarding her old PHENOMENAL RED. However, although the acquisition of such nonconceptual content is indispensable, it is sufficient to explain Mary’s epistemic progress. Third: assuming that concepts are mental files, after undergoing the visual experiences of red for the first time, such newly acquired nonconceptual content goes through a process of “digitization” so that it can be stored in the mental file PHENOMENAL RED. Fourth and final claim: it is based on this concept of PHENOMENAL RED, now phenomenally enriched by the newly acquired nonconceptual content, that Mary is able to identify introspectively the phenomenal red of her new experience.