Abstract
The aim of this paper is to critically assess and respond to two objections advanced by Daniel Stoljar (2005) against the so-called phenomenal concept strategy. My goal is to defend the physicalist response to both the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument against Stoljar’s objections. Regarding the conceivability argument, I want to show that the distinction mobilized by Stoljar between a priori and a priori synthesizable does not help us to elucidate the psychophysical condition for that is a clear disanalogy between the cases presented by Stoljar. Regarding the knowledge argument, I want to show that Stoljar’s argument about experienced Mary undermines the fundamental premise of the knowledge argument and therefore it cannot be mobilized to deflate the phenomenal concept strategy against the knowledge argument. My conclusion will be that Stoljar’s points are ineffective against the phenomenal concept strategy. Keywords: phenomenal concept, conceivability, physicalism, knowledge argument.
Highlights
The aim of this paper is to critically assess and respond to two objections advanced by Daniel Stoljar (2005) against the so-called phenomenal concept strategy
The so-ca led phenomenal concept strategy3 (Loar, 1990) is a physicalist set of responses to anti-physicalist ar uments that aims at accommodating the subjective chara er of consciousness to a physicalist metaphysical framework
Those we l-known ar uments share the same structure in that they depart from epistemic premises about the lack of deducibility of phenomenal truths from physical truths and move to the conclusion that phenomenal truths cannot be reduced to physical truths; physicalism must be false
Summary
The so-ca led phenomenal concept strategy (Loar, 1990) is a physicalist set of responses to anti-physicalist ar uments that aims at accommodating the subjective chara er of consciousness to a physicalist metaphysical framework. The phenomenal concept strategy consists in offering an alternative explanation for the lack of an a priori connection between phenomenal and physical truths that the knowledge ar ument and the conceivability ar ument hold to be true. They claim that the disconnection is not due to a property difference, but due to a conceptual difference. This sui gene is chara er of phenomenal concepts is held to ensure the aposteriority of the connection between phenomenal and physical truths If they are a posteriori connected, the link between conceivability and possibility is broken: (P and not Q) is conceiva le but needs not be metaphysica ly possi le. Type-B materialists think that by ascribing a ecial feature to phenomenal concepts, a feature that makes them essentia ly different from physical concepts, we achieve the desiderata for responding to the anti-physicalist ar uments in question
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
