Non-proliferation precedents: conflict between the US and Iran in the context of deterring the iranian nuclear program

Abstract

American efforts to prevent the creation of nuclear weapons by Iran from the 1950s to the present are analyzed. The development of the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis is assessed in its historical context: from the concept of Iran's nuclear program under the Shah to the achievement of a threshold level in the creation of nuclear weapons today. It is emphasized that during the years of allied relations with the Shah's Iran, Washington downplayed the role of non-proliferation. It is substantiated that after the victory of the 1979 Revolution, American policy was mainly focused not on the legal and technical aspects of the nonproliferation process, but on the desire to use criticism of the Iranian nuclear program to isolate Iran and achieve a change in the country's ruling religious leadership. It is substantiated that the sanctions did not force Tehran to abandon nuclear research, but only slowed down the pace of development of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. It is shown that President Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA in 2018 is a sabotage of nuclear non-proliferation, by early 2023 Iran has become much closer to creating nuclear weapons. It is assumed that Tehran could develop nuclear weapons in just a few months if it chooses to do so.