Abstract

The article examines the relationship between the United States and the EU on issues related to the Iranian nuclear program and ways to solve it during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017 – 2021). It is analyzed to what extent the contradictions between the US administration of President Donald Trump and the EU countries over the nuclear agreement with Iran have shaken Euro-Atlantic solidarity. The difference between the approaches of the European Union and the United States toward Iran's nuclear program during the presidency of Trump is discussed. It is considered how both sides tried to overcome these contradictions and how they tried to find a common approach to solving the problem of Iran's nuclear program in the framework of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. It has been shown that the main source of concern for both the United States and the European Union is not Iran's nuclear program only but also Iran's aggressive policy in the Middle East, and Tehran's progress in developing a space rocket program. The influence of the US Middle East Allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula) on the formation of Washington's position on Iran's nuclear program and on cooperation with the European Union on this issue has been studied. It has been found that the Donald Trump administration finds more in common with its Middle Eastern allies in pursuing a policy toward Iran than with the EU. The consequences of radicalizing Iranian nuclear policy in connection with the assassinations of Iranian General Kasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizade are considered. It was analyzed the prospects for Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or the return of Tehran to the nuclear agreement with the world's leading powers, which was signed by Iran in 2015 and which significantly limited Iran's nuclear program and reduced the chances of producing an Iranian atomic bomb. A comparative analysis of the US-EU response to Iran's latest steps to increase uranium enrichment, which could potentially bring Tehran closer to nuclear weapons, has been conducted. The consequences of President Trump's policy towards Iran for Euro-Atlantic unity are analyzed. Possible prospects for the development of US-EU cooperation in resolving the problem of Iran's nuclear program after the end of Trump's term are considered.

Highlights

  • Iran envisions that this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation

  • Eight years after Adoption Day or when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

  • Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to: 1. listed Iranian banks and financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran; 2. listed persons, entities and bodies related to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; 3. listed persons, entities and bodies related to shipping, shipbuilding and transport; 4. other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear, arms- and ballistic missile- related activities; 5. listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and

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Summary

TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. [2] 'Government officials' for the U.S means senior officials of the U.S Administration

ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT
OTHER REACTORS
SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES
ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT
47. Iran will
48. Iran will
OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT
80. In this context
Nuclear proliferation-related measures
Software
Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to
Other provisions
Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions
Nuclear Fuel
Procedures
Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting
Adoption Day
Implementation Day
15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I
16. The European Union will
Transition Day
20. The European Union will
21. The United States will
UNSCR Termination Day
Findings
25. The European Union will
Full Text
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