Abstract
Danish Euratom membership was particularly difficult for Denmark as its most Northern part Greenland, had vast uranium resources within its territory that in effect made Denmark a potential proliferator of nuclear material. Apart from being a window to the evolution of how countries developed their thinking on nuclear weaponry during the progression of the Cold War, this article shows how and why a small state may choose to proliferate nuclear material for a weapon despite having a non-proliferation policy. It argues that a small state like Denmark, caught between powerful political forces in the Cold War and in Europe made concessions to its uranium policy. This article is a contribution to the emerging scholarship on non-proliferation policy during the Cold War, specifically contributing with a perspective from a small state. In addition, the article is the first on the Danish Euratom history.
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