Abstract

In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what is known as the sufficiency view. Third, we believe children should receive their fair share of benefits and burdens. It is wrong to take more than our share, even if we do not reduce them to disease or destitution, and even if they would willingly waive their rights. When groups are threatened with extortion, we often render their rights inalienable. We should do so here. The rights of our descendants are not ones we would allow them to “waive.” These are plausible population principles not only toward our own children, but also toward more distant generations. In addition, they capture many people’s intuitions about animals. In the pre-refereed version of this paper (but not in the forthcoming published version) I develop an argument about the 'logic of the larder'. Some people argue that we do animals a favor by raising and eating them. I argue that here too we ought to ensure that as large a proportion as possible enjoy lives well worth living. In contrast to humans, most animals do not seek to accumulate beyond the level of sufficiency. Fairness requires only that their lives should be sufficient. The lives of many farm animals, however, are not sufficient. Moreover, much animal husbandry indirectly risks bringing both people and wild animals below sufficiency. By causing wild and domesticated animals to lead impoverished lives—and profiting at their expense—we take more than our fair share, just as we do from future people.

Highlights

  • Suppose our country faces a powerful enemy, and we face a choice between building up our army or acquiring nuclear weapons

  • This paper argues that we hold two key duties to future people: to leave them enough in an absolute sense, and to leave them their fair share

  • Even if we benefit people by bringing them into existence, we can wrongly exploit our position to take more than our share of benefits

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Summary

FAILING TO PROVIDE ENOUGH

In a famous example Parfit asks us to consider a fourteen year old girl who is thinking of having a baby. While it may not be bad for impoverished Bangladeshis to be born, Cubans would not be obliged to aid them if it left the latter themselves deprived.[29] We may, consider it unfair that some should live just above the sufficiency line and others well below it If so, this is a reason to adopt S2 rather than S3, minimizing the proportion of people who fall below sufficiency. For example, could impoverish future generations, but aggressive measures to curb carbon emissions could slow economic growth, miring many people in poverty.[30] Confronted with tradeoffs between risks, it makes sense to maximize the expected proportion above sufficiency, multiplying the numbers affected by the estimated chance of their falling below the threshold.[31] This speaks in favor of ambitious carbon mitigation.

TAKING MORE THAN OUR SHARE
CAN WE EXPLOIT THE PEOPLE OF THE DISTANT FUTURE?
Full Text
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