Abstract
Can a regime of warfare which employs deliberately indiscriminate violence towards civilians ever be regarded morally just? Both “common sense” and ethical arguments tend to clearly dismiss this sort of notion. In this paper, I intend to show through analysis of the 20th century and contemporary discourse on just war theory how the prima facie moral duty of sparing civilians has been constructed and upheld as a central condition of just warfare. In doing so, this paper aims to illustrate the conceptual differences several scholars and their theories employ regarding non-combatant immunity. This is hoped to become especially clear as I highlight not merely the more classical, state-centered approach to the ethics of war, but also deal with a very recent, cosmopolitan perspective on just warfare. Concluding, I propose that maintaining non-combatant immunity as an ethical necessity may depend on your perspective on how a “non-combatant” is distinguished, but still remains essential in terms of ethical regulation for actual warfare.
Published Version
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