Abstract

Abstract : This monograph examines the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam as a potential model for the design of modern campaigns targeted against revolutionary guerrilla insurgencies. The Vietnam War ended in failure; yet it represents America's most recent major effort against a guerrilla insurgency. Because U.S. vital strategic interests are likely to be threatened by insurgent movements in the future, an analysis of our record in countering the Vietcong insurgency demands attention. Although the U.S. failed to develop a viable counterstrategy to the Maoist revolutionary guerrilla strategy of North Vietnam (dau tranh), CORDS was a step in the right direction, albeit too late. CORDS effectively tied together the myriad of existing political, informational, economic, and military pacification programs into a synergistic whole. Based on a high degree of bureaucratic and organizational flexibility, CORDS enjoyed a respectable degree of success in countering the Vietcong insurgency. In this regard, CORDS provides us with a good model for the design of counterinsurgency campaigns. It also demonstrates that counter insurgency efforts are more than just a military undertaking. Therefore, this paper recommends that the United States develop a national counterinsurgency policy on the CORDS model.

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