Abstract
Abstract Some commentators have argued that curiosity, not honesty, is Nietzsche’s central intellectual virtue. These commentators give minimalistic interpretations of the nature of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty, casting it as a disposition to ensure that relevant epistemic standards are applied during belief formation. I argue against such interpretations by highlighting three strands of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty which they fail to accommodate (cf. GS 2, GS 335, BGE 230). I interpret Nietzsche’s concept of honesty against the background of his drive psychology and show that it applies not only to reflective cognitive processes but also to unconscious cognitive processes. In concluding, I explain the key role which honesty plays in Nietzsche’s project of translating ‘man back into nature’ (BGE 230).
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