A Relational Theory of Dignity and Human Rights: An Alternative to Autonomy

Abstract

Abstract In this article I draw on resources from the Global South, and particularly the African philosophical tradition, to construct a theory of human rights grounded on dignity that presents a challenge to globally dominant, autonomy-based approaches. Whereas the latter conceive of human rights violations as degradations of our rational nature, the former does so in terms of degradations of our capacity to be party to harmonious or friendly relationships. Although I have in the past presented the basics of this relational approach, in this article I present new argumentation in support of it. I defend it from criticism and also go on the offensive by arguing that understanding the human rights violations of torture and rape to be (roughly) behavior that treats innocent parties in an extremely discordant or unfriendly way is, if not more plausible than standard Kantian understandings, at least a promising alternative to them.