Abstract
Intelligence analysis is often viewed as a distant relative of the policy deliberations within military and naval organisations. This is especially apparent in contemporary settings, where policymaking is rigid and highly compartmentalised by the firewalls that exist between intelligence producers and consumers. The purpose of this article is to examine an overlooked case from intelligence history, when the creation of an intelligence function within the Admiralty had a profound impact upon the formulation and conduct of British naval policy in the 1880s. This inevitably encouraged new ways of thinking about how the Admiralty organised and prepared for war.
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