“A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude”: The British Foreign Office, American Neutrality and the Hoare-Laval Plan

Abstract

The Abyssinian imbroglio of 1935-1936 precipitated a major crisis for British foreign and defence policy-makers. Prior to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Italy was not counted amongst Britain's enemies. By October 1935 and especially after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia on 3 October, this situation had changed dramatically and Italian enmity now had to be considered in strategic calculations. As relations between Britain and Italy deteriorated as a result of Mussolini's expansionist aims in East Africa, the British government, and more specifically, the foreign office began to reassess Britain's strategic position. As a corollary to this reassessment, the British embarked on an examination of the effects of American policy on Britain's global strategy, particularly on the difficult issue of European peace and security. The attitude and actions of the government in Washington profoundly influenced the course of British foreign policy during the Abyssinian crisis. Concerns about American behaviour went beyond the issue of whether or not the United States would support a League of Nations’ oil sanction against Italy. Following the introduction of neutrality legislation in 1935, serious doubts began to take hold within the foreign office that the economic resources of the United States might not be available to Britain in the event of a future conflagration, as they had been during the Great War. By autumn 1935, when Anglo-Italian relations had reached the nadir of the inter-war period, this consideration became increasingly important. The uncertainty of American financial and material support induced the British to find a diplomatic solution to end the Abyssinian crisis, which played a significant role in the events that led to the Hoare-Laval agreement in December 1935.