Abstract
Many analysts have uncritically assumed that macroeconomic conditions affect presidential approval according to a reward-punishment model. They thereby have ignored the possibility that presidential approval may be governed by perceived differences in the macroeconomic priorities of presidential and opposition parties and that the impact of the macroeconomy varies according to prevailing contexts of political debate. Also, many previous models may be misleading because important political interventions have been omitted or inappropriately specified. The theoretical and methodological limitations of existing research raise a number of questions about the nature, generality and relative significance of macroeconomic influences on presidential support. Here, these questions are addressed by analyses of presidential approval during the presidencies of Carter, Reagan and their predecessors.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
