New Institutionalism and Minority Protection in the National Legislatures of Finland and Denmark

Abstract

The individual camps within the new institutionalist paradigm generally argue that every political actor operates within a specific framework of opportunities and that the physical environment in which bargaining takes place is very important to understanding political outcomes. This article uses three of the new institutionalisms to answer two important questions concerning minority‐protecting institutions in the national constitutions of Denmark (Article 42) and Finland (Section 66). First, why were such institutions developed? Second, why were these institutions ultimately removed in Finland, but not in Denmark? For both countries, it is argued in this article that historical and discursive institutionalism are useful for understanding why such protections were originally considered necessary by particular political groups in society: the rise of socialism during the late twentieth and early twenty‐first centuries compelled non‐reformist parties to push strongly for constitutional change that would legalize powerful procedural tools that could delay and potentially reverse policy decisions passed in parliament. However, the article invokes rational choice institutionalism to explain why the outcomes in terms of the use of such institutions differed over time in the two countries: differences concerning the scope and timing of the relevant procedures compelled opposition parties to utilize them differently. As a result, the legislative process was often stalemated in Finland (and the procedures were subsequently removed in 1992), while in Denmark, the procedures contributed to a parliamentary culture based on consensus and pre‐legislative bargaining and hence, still remain.