Abstract
New equilibrium concepts for noncooperative two‐person games are introduced and examined. Although these equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibria in all constant‐sum games, they differ significantly in other cases. In particular, for finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma, some cooperating strategy combinations become equilibria.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
