Abstract

We present a novel technique for source authentication of a packet stream in a network, which intends to give guarantees that a specific network flow really comes from a claimed origin. This mechanism, named packet level authentication (PLA), can be an essential tool for addressing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Based on designated verifier signature schemes, our proposal is an appropriate and unprecedented solution applying digital signatures for DoS prevention. Our scheme does not rely on an expensive public-key infrastructure and makes use of light cryptography machinery that is suitable in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). We analyze our proposed scheme as a defense measure considering known DoS attacks and present a formal proof of its resilience face to eventual adversaries. Furthermore, we compare our solution to already existent strategies, highlighting its advantages and drawbacks.

Highlights

  • The recent dissemination of Internet-based technologies such as peer-to-peer computing, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things yield to application scenarios where a non-measurable number of devices are connected and participate in multiple information flows supported by the InternetProtocol (IP) packet routing infrastructure

  • When a Bloom filter is a component of a network security solution, care must be taken for keeping the size of the Bloom filter appropriately adjustable according to the nature of the network traffic, considering that a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can abruptly change the characteristics of this traffic

  • If some adversary holds any strategy to efficiently distinguish between the set of signed packets took from the simulator described above and a set signed by Alice, such adversary strategy can be used to construct an efficient distinguisher for an underlying SDVS, contradicting the supposed properties of the scheme, i.e., that is infeasible for anyone, except the designated verifier, to recognize a valid signature when challenged with a pair containing a simulated and a valid signature

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Summary

Introduction

The recent dissemination of Internet-based technologies such as peer-to-peer computing, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things yield to application scenarios where a non-measurable number of devices are connected and participate in multiple information flows supported by the Internet. These new scenarios have introduced security challenges that are distinct mainly because they establish conditions to adversarial attacks in dimensions that are hardly manageable, especially in the case of denial of service attacks (DoS). Recent distributed denial of services attacks have involved a massive number of IoT devices. This paper presents a novel defense mechanism, consisting of a cryptographic protocol for the authentication of packet streams, which can be used to integrate a set of measures against DoS attacks. Besides the description of this contribution, we show how our proposal is resilient to known DoS attacks, showing the advantages of its application in the security of IoT environments, mainly regarding DoS attacks inside IoT systems, and that can be useful for countering attacks started from IoT devices to attain targets outside the IoT realm.

The Problem and Related Work
The Adversarial Model
DoS Attacks in the IoT Scenario
Denial of Service Countermeasure Techniques
Packet Filtering
Bloom Filter Forwarding
Cryptographic Puzzles
DoS Defenses in IoT Scenarios
Contribution and Overview
Cryptographic Tools and Assumptions
Digital Signature and Message Authentication
Proof of Security Paradigms
Simulation-Based Formulation
Proof by Reduction
Random Oracle Model
Secure Digital Signature Definitions
Undeniable Signature
Designated Verifier Signature—DVS
Strong Designated Verifier Signature —SDVS
Description of Our Scheme
Tagging Packets
Design Details and Parameters of the Proposed Scheme
Envisaged Application Scenarios
Application in a General Network Scenario
Application within an IoT Network Scenario
Resilience of Our Scheme in Face of DoS Attacks
Spoofing Attacks
Flooding Attacks
Denial of Capability Attacks
Content Forgery Attack
Finite State Analysis Regarding the Resilience of the Proposed Protocol
Finite State Automata
The Invariant Principle
Proving the Protocol Secure by Means of an FSA
The Protocol as a State Automata
The FSA States for the Players
The Transition Rules for the Players
The Proposed Protocol Invariants
How δ Depends on the Sender Signing Mechanism
Conclusions
Full Text
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