Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to offer a survey of the neuroscience of free will, particularly those studies of agency related to a now famous study by Benjamin Libet. I outline Libet and colleagues' (1983) study and its import for the neuroscience of free will. Three potential threats to the existence of intentional and free action on the basis of these studies are characterized. These threats are assessed via a tour of replications and extensions of Libet's results. I then press an objection to the broadly defined Libet paradigm, namely, that these neuroscientific studies of agency cannot generalize to conclusions about paradigmatically free decisions and actions due to the nature of actions tested in the laboratory. I conclude that even given marked improvements in the kinds of action under study in neuroscience, we ought to be wary of any strong claims regarding free will on the basis of these studies.
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