Abstract
This chapter introduces key concepts and provides a preview of the book. Featured concepts include action, action-individuation, intention, intentional action, and free will. Some standard terminology in the literature on free will is introduced, including agent causation, compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. The notion of free action central to the book is identified as moral-responsibility-level free action—free action of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being free to this set of conditions would entail that he is morally responsible for it.
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