Neurophysiological Determinism and Human Action

Abstract

Recent contributors to the freedom-determinism debate continue to complain that compatibilists ignore the question of the determinants of choices. An appropriate task, then, at this stage of the dispute is to examine carefully an actual deterministic theory of human behaviour and motivation to see its implications for our notion of the human agent as a morally responsible being. With the success of mechanical simulation of intelligence and advances in neurophysiology, commentators have turned to neurophysiological theory, seeing it as a threat to our concept of the human agent and to our moral attitudes. These considerations make it worth examining the incompatibilist case put forward by Ted Honderich in a recent article.1 He concludes that empirical findings, primarily in neurophysiology, support some theses which express a 'neurophysiological determinism' of human behaviour. In Honderich's view, these theses imply that we are not responsible agents, in particular, that responses such as 'holding something against someone' or 'being grateful to someone' are ruled out. The following are the theses which Honderich advances: (i) brain states are caused by other physical states; (ii) many brain states are correlates, i.e. accompaniments, of experiences including the important decidings and choosings; and (iii) some brain states have as their results certain movements of the body. These movements are actions, Honderich holds. This identity assumption is so crucial to his incompatibilism that it must rank as a fourth thesis. Honderich holds a notion of the power to act which is also essential to his incompatibilistic conclusion. In his view, to say that Claire's raising her knee in a certain situation has a cause, is to say that Claire cannot do other than raise her knee. This notion of power, together with the four theses, yields Honderich's conclusion 'that on every occasion when we act, we can only act as in fact we do'. Given Honderich's concept of responsibility, 'it follows too that we are not responsible for our actions, and, what is most fundamental, that we do not possess selves of a certain character' (p. I87). In Honderich's words, 'It is essential, however, to any determinism of a forceful kind, that it give an account of the place of decision, choice, and consciousness generally' (p. 214). Moreover, the theory of human action which is employed must be plausible and adequate, and the conceptions of power and responsibility should be appropriate and cogent. I shall try to show that Honderich's determinism fails to satisfy these requirements. The failure is instructive in helping us to discern the features of our actions and ourselves as agents which are essential to the maintenance of our familiar moral attitudes. In the course of the