Human acts, the relevancy matrix, and systems of relevancy

Abstract

Nothing is more ubiquitous within the human worlds than human activity, yet few of the constitutions of everyday living in these worlds are so rarely understood as what it means for a person to act.l The activities of persons within worlds-as-taken-for-granted, and the meanings these have for oneself and for other persons, are founding enactings through2 which the constitutions of the structures of the social worlds of everyday life arise. Any social science, therefore, must have in its foundation a theory (or theories) of human action; but each one of these sciences largely lacks this at present. One of the principal tasks of any philosophy of the social sciences at this stage is to construct theories of human action which may be employed fruitfully by the social sciences. It is within the context of these problems that I focus in this essay upon the phenomenon of relevance as a fundamental problem in any theory of human action. In due course I shall make certain distinctions between human action and a theory of human action; point to some of the major problems which have to be treated by any philosophy of human action;3 discuss certain views of