Abstract
This paper examines the points of disagreement between Neo-Darwinian and recent Neo-Aristotelian discussions of the status of purposive language in biology. I discuss recent Neo-Darwinian “evolutionary” treatments and distinguish three ways to deal with the philosophical status of teleological language of purpose: teleological error theory, methodological teleology, and Darwinian teleological realism. I then show how “non-evolutionary” Neo-Aristotelian approaches in the work of Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot differ from these by offering a view of purposiveness grounded in life-cycle patterns, rather than in long-term evolutionary processes or natural selection. Finally, I argue that the crucial difference between Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Aristotelian approaches regards the question of whether or not reproduction deserves the status of an “ultimate” aim of organisms. I offer reasons to reject the concept of an “ultimate” aim in evolutionary biology and to reject the notion that reproduction serves a purpose. I argue that evolutionary biology is not in the position to determine what the “ultimate” explanation of natural purpose is.
Highlights
Why do birds migrate? The obvious answer to this question might appear to be that they do so in order to find food, a more favorable habitat, and favorable weather conditions that will allow them to survive and satisfy their needs
The right way for the Darwinian teleological realist to make her point is to resist the temptation to suggest that reproduction serves a purpose while stressing that all other life-cycle events, vital processes, and behaviors serve the purpose of reproduction
Mayr’s (1961) paper posed a fascinating problem that continues to linger in evolutionary biology and the philosophy of biology and I have tried in this paper to draw out many of its wider implications—some of them even venturing into questions that might more accurately be called theological
Summary
Ernst Mayr’s classic 1961 article in Science, ‘‘Cause and Effect in Biology,’’ defended a widely recognized approach to such teleological language by introducing the term ‘‘teleonomy’’ and claiming that there are two sorts of questions that evolutionary biology is in the position to answer when it comes to basic questions like why birds migrate: ‘‘How?’’ questions and ‘‘Why?’’ questions (Mayr 1961). These two questions established a distinction between so-called ‘‘proximate’’ causes that investigate the mechanics of ‘‘how’’ bird movement works and ‘‘ultimate’’ causes that tell us the reason ‘‘why’’ birds migrate. By criticizing both the notion that reproduction serves a purpose and the notion that reproduction should have the status of ‘‘ultimacy’’ with regard to an organism’s activities, I show that non-evolutionary approaches offer a desirable corrective to the idea that evolutionary biology offers an ‘‘ultimate’’ explanation of life and purposiveness in nature
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