Abstract
Abstract Research on the state and governance in Senegal emphasizes the political role of Muslim orders (brotherhoods). These orders, and especially the Muridiyya, are at the center of the so-called “Senegalese social contract,” which, according to many observers, is the reason for the remarkable political stability of the postcolonial state. This contract, which has been thoroughly discussed by scholars, functions as a system for the exchange of services in which the state and the Sufi orders, even though apparently situated in different sociopolitical spaces, collaborate in preserving peace and stability. Along with other scholars, I have criticized the notion of “social contract,” especially the underlying assumption that shaykhs have total control over disciples, who are prepared to follow the path laid out by their spiritual guides without concern for their own interests. In this article, I explore the impact that the momentous political change in the year 2000 had on the relations between temporal and spiritual power in Senegal. I suggest that President Wade’s attempt to turn the Muridiyya into a political base is best understood as an experiment in caesaropapism and his failure portends a return to the apparent political neutrality and behind-the- scenes political transactions that have marked the history of the relations between the state and Sufi orders.
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