Abstract
How do criminal agendas affect a peace process with violent non-state actors? This article endeavors to resolve this question by presenting a qualitative analysis of the gang truce in El Salvador during the government of Mauricio Funes, using the Peace Triangle as an analytical framework based on three study variables: issues, behavior, and attitudes. It aims to make a double contribution to peace studies, filling a gap in academic knowledge about the sustainability of peace processes and examining the relationship between criminal agendas and conflict resolution. The study reveals that the former Salvadoran president’s inadequate management of criminal agendas transformed the peace negotiation into a damage control strategy, as it was not intended to modify the scale of gang-committed predatory crimes but rather, to shape its behavior.
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