Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of service caching in an MEC network under a service market with multiple network service providers competing for both computation and bandwidth resources in terms of Virtual Machines (VMs) in the MEC network. We first propose an Integer Linear Program (ILP) solution and a randomized rounding algorithm, for the problem without VM sharing among different network service providers. We then devise a distributed and stable game-theoretical mechanism for the problem with VM sharing among network service providers, with the aim to minimize the social cost of all network service providers, through introducing a novel cost sharing model and a coalition formation game. We also analyze the performance guarantee of the proposed mechanism, Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA). We thirdly consider the cost- and delay-sensitive service caching problem with temporal VM sharing, and propose a mechanism with provable SPoA. We finally evaluate the performance through extensive simulations and a real world test-bed implementation. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithms outperform existing approaches by achieving at least 40% lower social cost via service caching and resource sharing among different network service providers.

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