Naturalizing Darwall\u2019s Second Person Standpoint

Carme Isern-Mas,Antoni Gomila

doi:10.1007/s12124-020-09547-y

Abstract

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms.

Highlights

There have been several attempts to ground morality in the way we relate to others
We provide a naturalistic account of the motivational power of moral judgments, in "Special Obligations Towards Particular Subjects" section, and of our special obligations to particular subjects, in "Moral Emotions" section; both based on intersubjective interactions
In "The Limits of the Moral Community" section, we show how intersubjective interactions are already to be found in moral emotions

Summary

Introduction

There have been several attempts to ground morality in the way we relate to others. First attempts in this line can be found in the Idealist school. The victim demands the transgressor to move his foot; and the transgressor knows and feels that they ought to accept and respect the victim’s claim This feeling comes from the second-personal nature of the relationship at issue: it is a relationship of reciprocal accountability through which they address demands to each other, and hold one another responsible for compliance. In the practice of holding accountable, i.e. of giving and asking for reasons, agents involved in an interaction assume that they both have: (1) a right to make claims, to demand respect for those claims, and to resist the demands of the other; (2) a secondpersonal authority to make demands or claims, and to hold the other accountable for non-compliance without excuse; and, (3) a dignity which must be respected and which cannot be violated by any claim As this characterization makes clear, Darwall’s second-personal standpoint is normative, rather than descriptive. The legitimacy of moral norms and practices of mutual recognition has to be viewed as grounded in the dynamics of intersubjective demands

A Naturalistic Approach to the Second-person

Conclusion