A Reasonable MoralityHuman Morality.Samuel Scheffler

Abstract

Samuel Scheffler's Human Morality is a suggestive and stimulating discussion of the interplay between moral theory and moral psychology. In particular, he thinks that it is an important constraint on moral theory that it make demands on agents that can be integrated into a reasonable and satisfying life plan. This constraint, he argues, militates against extremely demanding conceptions of morality, such as consequentialism, and supports conceptions that, while not complacent, are moderate in their demands. Though Scheffler does not define a moderate moral theory in terms of agent-centered prerogatives, the moderate theory that he discusses here is a direct heir of the theory he defended ten years earlier in The Rejection of Consequentalism.' The chief virtue of a moderate moral theory is that it is better situated than its rivals to explain the special authority of morality. Scheffler structures much of his discussion by examining the way in which different properties of a moral theory-for instance, its scope and demands-interact with different possible expectations about the authority of morality-for instance, whether moral requirements ought always to be overriding in practical deliberation. The level of abstraction at which Scheffler's discussion proceeds establishes a fruitful analytical framework within which to locate and assess familiar views and debates and allows him to explain the appeal of the sort of moral theory he has advocated before. And along the way, Scheffler provides a sensible defense of the aims and authority of moral theory against its historicist, communitarian, and particularist critics. Scheffler's abstract analytical framework is clearly helpful. But his discussion is often very schematic. Rival conceptions of moral theory, psychology, and practical rationality could be explored more systemati-