Abstract
The study explores empirically forest resource and soil quality degradation under different property rights regimes in a subsistence agriculture framework. The quantitative analysis is a direct test of the theoretical hypothesis of Larson and Bromley (1990) [Larson, B., Bromley, D., 1990. Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation: locating the tragedy. Journal of Development Economics 33 (2).] that common property and private property rights may lead to similar incentives for resource protection. A household model is formulated and applied empirically with data from Indonesia to test rates of forest biomass and soil quality degradation under private and common property rights. Results show that the two regimes may equal each other by including bequest value. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by changing model parameters.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
