Abstract
In 2003, NATO set out to support the establishment of ‘a self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government able to exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan.’ The article examines why NATO’s attempt to bring stability to Afghanistan over the decade that followed failed to advance its initial and highly ambitious vision for the country. A fundamental inability to recognise and engage with the drivers and dynamics of conflict within Afghanistan provides an important part of the answer. Underlying divisions and tensions among key allies over strategic objectives in Afghanistan were also major sources of fragmentation and incoherence in NATO’s involvement. Above all, the failure to prioritise the search for an inclusive political settlement among parties to the conflict and to tailor operations on the ground to a realisable political objective ensured growing insecurity and instability over time. The experience holds important lessons for the theory and practice of stabilisation.
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