Abstract
The ethnic commitment problem is thought to complicate interethnic bargaining because as power shifts, the stronger party might erode an agreement through ‘salami slicing.’ Anecdotally salami slicing can be effective, but it is unclear if a salami slicing strategy is feasible over the long term. A case study of the events following the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie demonstrates that while a calibrated erosion of an agreement is possible, in practice salami tactics exist as part of a larger collection of strategies for altering agreements. The article concludes with a typology of strategies for effecting agreement change.
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