NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change

Abstract

This article is a policy-relevant elaboration of the theory of collective action, particularly regarding the effects of declining hegemony on international regimes. Analysis of the distribution of defense expenditures in NATO indicates that this theory still provides valuable insights into the operation of the alliance, particularly regarding the role of the United States. Contrary to the conclusion of a series of influential articles, NATO still seems in essence a uniquely privileged group seeking an inclusive public good: regional security through deterrence. But, as theoretically expected, America's contribution to collective security has been sensitive to its declining economic preponderance. The implications of these findings for the future of the alliance are considered. Burden sharing in the North Atlantic alliance has interested political scientists and economists for more than two decades for the light it sheds on the problem of international cooperation and the provision of collective, or public, goods. The distribution of defense expenditures among the allies is, of course, also very important to policy makers and citizens of the allied countries. In this article, we address both groups. The analysis is meant to be a policy-relevant elaboration of the theory of collective action, particularly regarding the effects of declining hegemony on international regimes. But consideration of burden sharing inevitably raises questions about the adequacy of the allies' military capabilities and the role each nation plays in the collective effort, so these topics also receive attention. We first review the history of the debate over burden sharing in the North Atlantic alliance. Then we discuss the theory of collective action, consider its limits in accounting for national defense expenditures, and identify the insights it still provides. Finally, we speculate from this theoretical perspective on future relations between the United States and its European allies.