National Technology Initiative in the Context of International Relations

One of the development indicators of a country is transportation infrastructure and investments in transportation. Especially in the last 20 years, Türkiye has made very significant investments in transportation infrastructure and supported these investments with domestic and national technologies. Our country, which has made very significant investments in highway, railway and airway transportation in the last 10 years, aims to develop this in seaway investments in the coming years. In this study, the investments made by the country in the 21st century in the fields of transportation in general and Intelligent Transportation Systems in particular and the domestic and national technologies used by Intelligent Transportation Systems have been examined. In other words, it is aimed to analyze Türkiye’s domestic and national transportation technology move in detail, based on the domestic and national transportation technology products developed by the domestic supplier companies working here, not by the model of the investments and by whom. In our country, which used imported technology more in Highways, Bridges, Tunnels, Urban Traffic Management and Control Systems, Rail Systems, Civil Aviation, Maritime Transportation, Micro Mobility, Web and Mobile and similar applications until the 2000s, after 2000s’ domestic and national technologies in these areas were used more. Türkiye tries to reach a level that can compete with the leading countries of the sector such as Korea, Japan, Germany and the USA. Our country, which has made considerably large investments in the field of transportation in the world, will be among the first 20 countries in international competition. In the coming years if it continues this momentum for its Intelligent Transportation Systems investments which is pointed by all investment data and international foresight reports. The national technology initiative made in the defense industry can be given as a positive example in this sense.

Türkiye failed to launch an industrialization drive and ensure production-driven development for a long time. Whereas the country came up with various development models to address that problem at different points in the Republic’s history, the desired success began to be seen in the 2000s thanks to political stability and, by extension, the development of a long-term perspective on R&D, innovation, production, and development. Today, Türkiye has become a country that takes major strides in production and technology. This study analyzes the transformation that the National Technology Initiative has fueled in our country in recent years and the future of that transformation. Primarily, it demonstrates what Türkiye has achieved in R&D, technology and production, with contributions from an overhaul of the regulatory and institutional infrastructures, over the last two decades with the help of concrete indicators. Subsequently, this article establishes how the defense industry’s idiosyncratic governance model inspired the National Technology Initiative’s initial achievements. In this regard, it presents some of the projects that are successfully implemented today thanks to the momentum that the defense industry has generated. The third part of this study, in turn, underscores why it is absolutely necessary for Türkiye, a country with great ideals for the future, to focus on paradigm shifts and disruptive technologies (as it has in the defense industry) and to develop a long-term and systematic perspective as humanity witnesses the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It also explains the various steps, which Türkiye plans to take in the area of innovative and disruptive technologies for this purpose within the framework of its 2023 Industry and Technology Strategy and the existing sector-oriented strategies and roadmaps. Last but not least, pointing out that the country building on its National Technology Initiative with human capital, technology entrepreneurship, R&D and investment incentives, along with public investments, shall determine the outcome, direction and momentum of that venture, this article notes that the National Technology Initiative, which the Turkish people have embraced with a spirit of mobilization, shall be valuable for Türkiye as well as humanity as a whole.

Exports of technology and items containing technical information are regulated by the United States government. United States export control regulations exist to help protect national security, economic, and political interests. United States defense industry companies manufacture products and develop technologies and information that the United States has a particular interest in protecting. Therefore, defense industry companies must comply with United States export control regulations when exporting items and information to their international partners and customers. An “export” not only includes shipments of hardware or other tangible assets to foreign end-users but also includes the sharing of certain types of information with foreign recipients in the form of phone conversations, emails, meetings, conferences, presentations, and so on. Many employees of defense industry companies travel internationally with company issued laptops and cellphones containing company information that could be viewed by foreign persons. All of these activities are considered exports and may require prior authorization from the United States government under export control regulations. Failure to follow export regulations could result in a violation requiring a report to the United States government that may result in civil penalties or criminal charges. Additionally, intentional as well as unintentional releases of information to certain foreign persons could be detrimental to a defense industry company’s business and reputation and may even result in security concerns for the United States. Although the government has an interest in regulating defense industry companies’ technology and information, critics argue that strong export control regulations may result in invasions of privacy, violations of free speech, and a displacement of the United States as a leader in a world of technological advancement. However, despite current regulations, defense industry information is still at risk of cyberattacks and inadvertent data releases, creating potential threats to national security and the security of company technology and information. In an effort to secure company and sensitive information while exporting, defense industry companies utilize encryption and other cybersecurity measures. Advancing technologies in cybersecurity can help the government and defense industry companies by bolstering the security of their information. These same advancements can also aid attackers in breaking through cybersecurity defenses. Some advances in technology are even preventing law enforcement from gathering necessary information to conduct investigations when cyber-attacks occur, making it difficult to identify criminal actors and seek justice.The United States government faces challenges in creating and up- dating regulations to keep up with consistently advancing technology. Likewise, defense industry companies must adhere to government regulations by creating robust compliance programs, but they should also implement security and compliance measures above and beyond what the government requires to ensure more effective security for their technology and information. This Article discusses the effect of advancing cyber technology; United States export regulations; reporting requirements related to the export of encrypted items; and encryption technology in the defense industry. First, the Article defines encryption and encrypted items. Second, the Article explains United States regulations of ex- ports and specifically, regulations related to encryption and encrypted items. Third, the Article explains the need for defense industry companies to export and to use encrypted items. Fourth, the Article analyzes criticisms of export regulations and the differing views on United States controls. Fifth, the Article will discuss the complexities of com- plying with export regulations and defense industry compliance pro- grams. Sixth, the Article examines the outlook for encryption technology, the future of regulations related to cybersecurity, and the outlook for defense industry security measures and compliance with regulations. The United States government is beginning to recognize the need for more advanced security measures to protect domestically produced technology and information, especially information that puts national security at risk. Specifically, the technology and information produced by United States defense industry companies should be protected from getting into the hands of our foreign adversaries at all costs. In response to the growing need for security measures, the United States government has implemented new programs, commissions, agencies, and projects to create more robust security systems and regulations. The United States should employ the most talented and experienced cybersecurity professionals to innovate and produce security systems that protect our nation’s most sensitive information. The government should then provide these systems to its defense industry companies at minimal cost and should require companies to use the best technology in its security measures. With or without the government’s assistance, defense industry companies within the United States must also implement their own measures of protection. Current policies offer little protection of sensitive and export controlled information including encrypted items and in- formation. In addition, the government should also provide the defense industry companies better guidance and access to resources in order to assist them in protecting the important information and encrypted items.207 For example, any new systems or software purchased by the United States should be made available to defense industry companies as the standard. If the government truly wishes to protect its most important technology and information, it should provide the new systems at minimal cost to the defense industry. Advancements in security programs should be shared with defense industry companies as soon as they are available and ready for use. Nevertheless, the government may not want to provide defense industry companies with the best security technology because in the event that the government needs to conduct an investigation, a company utilizing strong cyber- security and encryption software is much more difficult to investigate. Alternatively, the United States could update current regulations to require that defense industry companies must utilize specific security measures or face a penalty for failing to do so. Such regulation could require defense companies to implement more robust security pro- grams with updated security software. This is a less effective solution as the advancement in cyberattack technology increases so rapidly, and reformed regulations will likely be outdated as soon as they are implemented. It makes more sense to require that defense companies must implement the most updated software and programs determined by government security experts and cyber-security experts. Also, by allowing defense companies to decide which security companies it will work with, the defense companies obtain the option to shop for the best and most expensive program, or the company could choose the cheapest option, resulting in less efficient security. Cybersecurity regulations that are too specific run the risk of being outdated quickly, whereas broad requirements leave the option for companies to implement the lowest of security measures. Even if the government declines these suggested measures, defense industry companies should make the protection of their sensitive in- formation and encrypted items top priority. This method would re- quire complete buy-in from the senior management within the company and a thorough flow-down of cultural beliefs among its employees. A change in norms must be implemented, and defense industry personnel should be inundated with reminders on the importance of information security. Companies should provide employees with easy access to guidance, training, and assistance in handling, sharing, protecting, and exporting sensitive and export controlled information. Changing company culture takes time, and failure to change personnel beliefs will result in a lack of understanding and potential violations of export control regulations. In the worst cases, data spills and cyberattacks could result in the loss of sensitive or even classified in- formation that could jeopardize national security. Huge unauthorized data releases of sensitive information will negatively affect a company’s reputation thus affecting its ability to generate revenue. The risks in using and exporting encryption technology and sensitive information should be a major concern for defense industry companies. This concern should motivate the government to invest significant resources into compliance programs. Resources such as dedicated and qualified personnel can create policy and procedure to ensure compliance with United States government regulations, and the procedures will provide guidance and training to all employees. In addition, companies should employ IT security, data security, and counterintelligence personnel to work with the compliance team in innovating preventive measures and in addressing any potential data releases and export violations. Immediate actions and counter measures should be prioritized not just among the compliance and security teams but should be a known, expected response from all employees. In other words, cybersecurity norms should be instilled company-wide and thoroughly policed from within the company. How a company chooses to implement such measures remains discretionary, but a better resourced compliance department dedicated to implementing effective policies and responding quickly to potential issues will prevent export control violations and data releases of important information. Defense industry companies transfer export controlle

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to China, whose drive for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges that we face. Beijing's goal of becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply into focus. It is pursuing these goals through an ambitious economic reform agenda, military modernization, and a complex web of initiatives aimed at expanding China's international influence--especially relative to the United States.... Russian arms are a key component of this buildup. [But] arms sales are only one element of a burgeoning Sino-Russian relationship. Moscow and Beijing plan to sign a 'friendship treaty' later this year, highlighting common interests and a willingness to cooperate diplomatically against US policies that they see as unfriendly to their interest. -- George J. Tenet, Director, CIA (1) February 2001 The Chinese military is in the process of a long-term strategic modernization program. Uniformed and civilian leaders in Beijing have studied recent conflicts, including the United States' performance in the Gulf War and its more recent operation in Kosovo. Their studies have analyzed comparative Chinese shortfalls and identified improvements that need to be made in their forces and doctrine. China's military leaders are well aware of the gap in modem military capabilities that exists between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and modem militaries exemplified by the US armed forces. Most foreign analyses concerning the existing and potential Chinese military threat emphasize recent equipment purchases from Russia and the trends these purchases portend. This article reviews and analyzes those acquisitions in relation to Chinese strategic modernization, draws overall conclusions, and then suggests that an expanded policy of engagement with China is the best course for the United States. The notion of containing China is not realistic. Instead, the United States should continue to improve its relations with China, to use its strong position of power and influence to build a solid foundation for US-China relations, and to shape that relationship to both countries' present and future mutual benefit. A Strategic Relationship of Mutual Necessity Russia clearly has become China's chief supplier of modern weapons and military technology. Virtually all of the weapons technology of the former Soviet Union, including its most advanced systems, is now for sale to the highest bidder--which has turned out to be China. About 70 percent of Russia's foreign arms sales went to China in 2000. (2) Some observers have characterized the Chinese approach toward purchasing Russian military equipment as buyers at a fire sale. (3) Russian arms merchants have introduced Chinese military leaders to a variety of hardware and technology that could greatly improve existing PLA capabilities. Thanks to the Russian connection, China can conceivably, through reverse engineering, leapfrog over obsolete intermediate technologies, perhaps developing state-of-the-art military capabilities comparable to those of the United States in a decade or less. (4) In the not-too-distant future, China may well be producing sophisticated weapon systems domestically. Elements of the defense industries in both China and Russia have established relationships with their counterpart organizations. The foundation for these relationships was set during then-President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in late April 1996. (5) These relationships continue to be endorsed. Indeed, they are supported even more strongly by Russia's current President, Vladimir Putin, based on his apparent intent to secure short-term gains in hard currency for the Russian economy and political clout from Russia's comeback in the global arms business. (6) Over the past five years, reports of negotiations for many advanced systems and technologies have been widespread, although they are generally vague and sometimes exaggerated. …

Procurement and the chain of supply: A general framework

The National Technology Initiative has been put forward in the last fifteen years as a step towards the technology and innovation competitiveness needed by our country, which has been defined in order to ensure Türkiye’s economic and technological independence. The building blocks of the National Technology Initiative consist of five basic components and are carried out together with our higher education institutions to revive the competitiveness needed according to the principles of “High Technology and Innovation”, “Digital Transformation and Industry Initiative”, “Entrepreneurship”, “Human Capital” and “Infrastructure”. Within the scope of an effective and efficient program, a structure that leads the private sector and works in coordination with on-site R&D, subject-oriented development and productization studies and the production of new technologies has been established. The National Technology Initiative is defined as a national struggle, and a comprehensive study is carried out, especially in research universities, in order to make our country a global actor in the field of technology and industry. Developing critical technologies locally and nationally, providing competitive research, development, products and services in high-tech fields, increasing our share in global value chains with original and innovative production are among the main objectives of the National Technology Initiative. It is the beginning of a long-term mobilization process in order to increase the use of trained manpower and infrastructure, expand the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and make the existence of interdisciplinary participatory stakeholders in this ecosystem independent of technology and welfare. The fact that Türkiye can be a pioneer in the international arena, R&D infrastructure, trained manpower, innovative business models, products and services depends on having a strong higher education and entrepreneurship ecosystem. In this manner, thanks to our researchers and entrepreneurs, who can read the global economy well and will enable Türkiye to open up to international markets. Türkiye will achieve a stronger structure in the future through its strong universities, with the initiative of national technology.

The process of diversification in the defense industry enterprises, besides ensuring the loading of high-tech equipment, first of all, calls for the technological independence of the country, capable of developing under conditions of instability in international relations. The aim of the study is to identify a successful large-scale experience of diversification in the international arena (using the example of the United States, China and Germany), and to formulate specific packages of measures and formats for overcoming stagnation in cooperation between the defense industry and the fuel and energy complex in the Russian Federation. The methodological basis of the study assumes using a systemic and synergetic approach, which in general approximation boils down to enhancing the mutual beneficial effect of its elements. Also, when writing the article, the author applied a quantitative analysis of statistical data, historical and descriptive methods, a comparative method. As the main result, he proposed the formats of interaction between the military and industrial complex and fuel and energy complex, aimed at more efficient use of the potential of the defense industry to meet the needs of organizations in the fuel and energy complex, increasing the volume of output of products at the defense industry enterprises and expanding its range. More active interaction of the defense industry works with organizations of the fuel and energy complex will allow them in the near future to set up producing the new types of civilian products and technologies, and fuel and energy companies to obtain competitive high-tech products.

This paper examines defense industrialization in three leading arms-producing states in Asia – India, Japan, and South Korea – and how their experiences compare to China's recent defense industrial developments. It argues that despite decades of considerable effort and investments in pursuit of a techno-nationalist self-arming strategy, these countries have experienced only modest success when it comes to achieving such self-reliance. Most regional defense industrial bases lack the necessary design skills and technological expertise in order to truly innovate, and at best these countries act as ‘late innovators’ when it comes to armaments production. The experiences of these countries have lessons for China as it attempts to move into the first tier of arms-producing states. China has over the past 15 years made significant progress in modernizing its defense technological and industrial base. At the same time, China faces the same long-term challenges that currently confront other regional arms industries – that is, making techno-nationalism work at the later stages of innovation. This is particularly critical as China's defense industry strives to move from a basically platform-centric to an increasingly network-centric technological–industrial process.

Turkish society has sought to become a contemporary civilization for centuries, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic days. It has been understood that, to achieve this goal, it is a prior necessity to become advanced in defense and technical fields. However, international, and domestic obstacles have made it difficult to achieve this goal. In particular, the unbudging mentality that accepted surrender within the domestic realm, stood against the breakthroughs that were trying to be achieved. Therefore, a clear and holistic change of opinion had to be put forward. The trigger for this change was Cyprus Peace Operation. In 1974, Türkiye experienced an important paradigm shift in technology development thinking. The National Technology Initiative, which has become a tangible target today, was initiated for a fully independent Türkiye and foundation companies such as Aselsan, which would operate in the field of defense, were established. It had also been understood that Türkiye’s goal for full independence was possible with developing a high technology national defense industry. Eventually, the defense industry would act as a locomotive in Türkiye’s development. The transition of defense expenditures from imports to Research and Developments and subsequently to the defense industry infrastructure would also support economic growth. Technological progress in the defense industry has also positively affected civilian use. Positive feedback had begun to be received, too. On the other hand, in the defense field, the export-import balance has changed in favor of exports. Unmanned aerial vehicle development studies, which started with the ideals of creating a spark effect in the early 2000s (H. Bayraktar and Bayraktar, 2004), have become a symbol for Türkiye. Armed / Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (A/UAVs) developed nationally and indigenously by Baykar achieved a significant export success. Acting as game-changing force in the operations in which they are used, these tools have led to a different perspective and transformation in combat doctrines (Nast, 2022). With the Native and Indigenous Manufacturing Model created by Baykar within the scope of National Technology Initiative, the R&D studies carried out in the field together with the security forces made it possible to develop high-tech, effective and up-to-date products in a short time period. While counterterrorism efforts came almost to an end in the domestic realm, Türkiye’s struggle against terrorism on abroad had transformed into a new level. In addition, Bayraktar TB2 UAVs continue to be actively used in humanitarian missions such as in natural disasters. The development and production activities are carried out within the scope of national and indigenous development model, starting with the smallest class Bayraktar Mini Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, continuing with Bayraktar TB2 UAV, Bayraktar Akıncı Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV), and further with the new generation Bayraktar TB3 UAV and Bayraktar Kızılelma Unmanned Combat Aerial System (UCAS).

Chengdu-Chongqing area has a strong foundation of the national defense science, technology and industry and the implementation of the regional development strategy of Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle has injected continuous impetus into the military-civilian coordinated development of the defense science, technology and industry in the circle. In order to promote the military-civilian coordinated development of the defense science, technology and industry, Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle has established a series of mechanisms to coordinate the resources and elements of the defense science and technology in Chengdu-Chongqing, realize the integration of defense science and technology, and promote the military-civilian coordinated development of the defense science and technology and industry. The practice has proved that the mechanism has remarkable effects but there are some problems which need to be carefully summarized and analyzed to further optimize the military-civilian collaborative development mechanism of the defense science, technology and industry in the economic circle.

: Because of oil, the United States has a vital national interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf region. The conundrum is that large amounts of conventional arms are flowing into the region each year and the U.S. is the biggest arms exporter to the world and specifically to the Persian Gulf. The end of the Cold War prompted a U.S. defense procurement holiday that forced the drastic resizing of the entire defense industrial base. The downsizing and globalization of the defense industry has resulted in multinational corporations with a production presence in multiple countries where the U.S. has limited influence. The Persian Gulf is the world's largest developing region arms importer. These arms sales are avidly sought after by the U.S. defense industry and the U.S. Government is actively promoting these sales. Despite these arms transfers, current deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in friendly forces and limited progress is being made toward integrating the Southern Gulf States militaries. This study explores the trend of arms transfers from the U.S. to the Persian Gulf, U.S. policy on arms transfers, and the military and geopolitical situation influencing policy decisions in the Persian Gulf.

executive summary: This article examines Taiwan’s defense industry and finds that, despite recent efforts to enhance its industrial capabilities, Taiwan struggles to produce and procure a sufficient quantity of weaponry, ordnance, and support equipment due to historical, international, and domestic constraints. main argumentTaiwan’s defense industry is essential to its national security amid increasing pressure from China, but producing and procuring enough weaponry, ordnance, and support equipment more autonomously remains a persistent challenge. U.S. restrictions on technology transfers, aimed at maintaining regional stability and not provoking China, limit Taiwan’s access to advanced defense technologies. At the same time, China’s diplomatic and economic coercion discourages other states from engaging in arms sales or defense-related technology transfers to Taiwan. Domestically, Taiwan faces structural constraints, including partisan political divisions, a limited defense budget, a small domestic market, and an erosion of technical expertise following the completion of major defense projects. Despite these challenges, Taiwan has demonstrated strengths in asymmetric capabilities, such as missiles and unmanned technologies, as well as a competitive edge in dual-use innovation. However, Taiwan and its security partners must define the most critical defense capabilities and prioritize the most cost-efficient defense industrial strategy within existing resource constraints. policy implications• Taiwan’s defense industry must align with its evolving defense strategy, prioritizing resilience, asymmetric capabilities, and integration with allied security frameworks. To sustain deterrence against China, Taiwan will need to strengthen domestic production in critical areas, such as surface-to-sea missiles and drones, while ensuring interoperability with U.S. and allied forces. • Taiwan must enhance long-range precision-strike, asymmetric warfare, and sustainment capabilities to counter China’s military advantage. This includes investing in missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and mobile air defense and stockpiling essential supplies to ensure prolonged resistance in a conflict scenario. • Given its resource scarcity, Taiwan should balance indigenous production, joint development, and imports to optimize its defense capabilities. Prioritizing domestic production for asymmetric systems, co-producing complex platforms, and relying on U.S. imports for high-tech assets will ensure cost-effectiveness and technological advancement.

The article is devoted to the analysis and systematization of problems in the aerospace industry. In recent years, Ukraine has been actively selling military equipment, machinery and weapons. In general, the export of military products, including aerospace equipment, has significantly weakened the state's military capabilities and made the country vulnerable both in terms of the military component and national security as a whole. To the main problems of the aerospace industry as part of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine the authors refer: insufficient budget funding, the lack of its own spaceport, the massive outflow of the intellectual elite from the country to work in developed countries, the inability to approve the Sixth Space Program for the coming years, the state monopoly in the industry, corruption. The main problem of the lack of industry development is the direct military conflict with the Russian Federation, which directly affects not only this strategic sector, but also the defense industry as a whole. The right and economically justified step in solving the problem of developing the industry and restoring the industry's own production would be to fight the state monopoly and pass new bills allowing private investment and initiatives in this industry market. The global experience of public-private partnership, easing of regulatory procedures, transparency of bureaucratic mechanisms, active anti-corruption policy have contributed to the fact that the United States, G-7 countries, Turkey took the leading position in the development of space programs, exports of aircraft, space exploration and research. The article presents ways to eliminate the problems of the aerospace industry as a whole, as well as recommendations with their clear reasoning and validity in the study area. The scientific potential accumulated over the past decades in the field of information technology, as well as experience in the development and production of military aerospace equipment, supported by a quality regulatory framework, would contribute to the growth of enterprises, the country's export potential, and the ability to replenish its own military reserves. The state the aerospace industry is in requires clear and urgent action on the part of the government, because the situation will only get worse over time.

As its economy developed, China managed to improve the combat capabilities of its military and defense industry. The presence of China as a new power that has the potential to become hegemony in the region, has caused anxiety for countries in Southeast Asia. Complexity in the region grew after the United States, Britain and Australia formed a new military alliance "AUKUS" in 2021. The research method used is qualitative descriptive, according to Sugiyono, descriptive method is research that describes the state of the object being studied as it is, according to the situation and conditions when the research is carried out. Theories used balance of power, and Stap-to-war. China's military modernization makes the country strong and has the potential to become hegemony in the region. This situation prompted the region's country to improve its military capabilities, produce weaponry and military equipment, and even form military alliances. The AUKUS is a balance of power to offset China's influence, by building nuclear-powered submarines, and is currently developing mach-5 hypersonic missiles. The U.S.-China rivalry makes the LCS region a single geostrategic theater. Indonesia implements an active defense strategy, with pays attention to aspects of geographical conditions as an island nation.

Purpose: to evaluate the options for strategic localization for the defence industrial sector of Ukraine and to provide practical recommendations for the implementation of the policy. Method: comparative analysis, synthesis, and case studies. Findings: Rebuilding Ukraine’s degraded defence industry is vital for its long-term security and strategic interests, and a robust Ukrainian defence industry supports partner nation security interests as well. While continued foreign assistance remains essential in the short term, Ukraine needs to progressively localize repair, assembly, and repair capabilities for its most critical military equipment. Theoretical implications: The paper enhances our understanding of key concepts relating to the contributions of the local defence industry to the security of Ukraine, and how those industries can be developed to support the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war serves as a contemporary case study to explore these theories in practice. The paper provides new insights for understanding the practical application of the policy of localization. Value: Examining the practical implications of the policy of localization in Ukraine’s defence industry in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war involves understanding how these theories translate into real-world recommendations, both for Ukraine and for its international partners. that can contribute to the development and sustainment of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Research limitations: The classification of much information relating to Ukraine’s defence industry and defence capabilities, along with the contributions of international partners, forms a limitation on the scope and depth of the study.