Cybersecurity, Encryption, and Defense Industry Compliance with United States Export Regulations
Exports of technology and items containing technical information are regulated by the United States government. United States export control regulations exist to help protect national security, economic, and political interests. United States defense industry companies manufacture products and develop technologies and information that the United States has a particular interest in protecting. Therefore, defense industry companies must comply with United States export control regulations when exporting items and information to their international partners and customers. An “export” not only includes shipments of hardware or other tangible assets to foreign end-users but also includes the sharing of certain types of information with foreign recipients in the form of phone conversations, emails, meetings, conferences, presentations, and so on. Many employees of defense industry companies travel internationally with company issued laptops and cellphones containing company information that could be viewed by foreign persons. All of these activities are considered exports and may require prior authorization from the United States government under export control regulations. Failure to follow export regulations could result in a violation requiring a report to the United States government that may result in civil penalties or criminal charges. Additionally, intentional as well as unintentional releases of information to certain foreign persons could be detrimental to a defense industry company’s business and reputation and may even result in security concerns for the United States. Although the government has an interest in regulating defense industry companies’ technology and information, critics argue that strong export control regulations may result in invasions of privacy, violations of free speech, and a displacement of the United States as a leader in a world of technological advancement. However, despite current regulations, defense industry information is still at risk of cyberattacks and inadvertent data releases, creating potential threats to national security and the security of company technology and information. In an effort to secure company and sensitive information while exporting, defense industry companies utilize encryption and other cybersecurity measures. Advancing technologies in cybersecurity can help the government and defense industry companies by bolstering the security of their information. These same advancements can also aid attackers in breaking through cybersecurity defenses. Some advances in technology are even preventing law enforcement from gathering necessary information to conduct investigations when cyber-attacks occur, making it difficult to identify criminal actors and seek justice.The United States government faces challenges in creating and up- dating regulations to keep up with consistently advancing technology. Likewise, defense industry companies must adhere to government regulations by creating robust compliance programs, but they should also implement security and compliance measures above and beyond what the government requires to ensure more effective security for their technology and information. This Article discusses the effect of advancing cyber technology; United States export regulations; reporting requirements related to the export of encrypted items; and encryption technology in the defense industry. First, the Article defines encryption and encrypted items. Second, the Article explains United States regulations of ex- ports and specifically, regulations related to encryption and encrypted items. Third, the Article explains the need for defense industry companies to export and to use encrypted items. Fourth, the Article analyzes criticisms of export regulations and the differing views on United States controls. Fifth, the Article will discuss the complexities of com- plying with export regulations and defense industry compliance pro- grams. Sixth, the Article examines the outlook for encryption technology, the future of regulations related to cybersecurity, and the outlook for defense industry security measures and compliance with regulations. The United States government is beginning to recognize the need for more advanced security measures to protect domestically produced technology and information, especially information that puts national security at risk. Specifically, the technology and information produced by United States defense industry companies should be protected from getting into the hands of our foreign adversaries at all costs. In response to the growing need for security measures, the United States government has implemented new programs, commissions, agencies, and projects to create more robust security systems and regulations. The United States should employ the most talented and experienced cybersecurity professionals to innovate and produce security systems that protect our nation’s most sensitive information. The government should then provide these systems to its defense industry companies at minimal cost and should require companies to use the best technology in its security measures. With or without the government’s assistance, defense industry companies within the United States must also implement their own measures of protection. Current policies offer little protection of sensitive and export controlled information including encrypted items and in- formation. In addition, the government should also provide the defense industry companies better guidance and access to resources in order to assist them in protecting the important information and encrypted items.207 For example, any new systems or software purchased by the United States should be made available to defense industry companies as the standard. If the government truly wishes to protect its most important technology and information, it should provide the new systems at minimal cost to the defense industry. Advancements in security programs should be shared with defense industry companies as soon as they are available and ready for use. Nevertheless, the government may not want to provide defense industry companies with the best security technology because in the event that the government needs to conduct an investigation, a company utilizing strong cyber- security and encryption software is much more difficult to investigate. Alternatively, the United States could update current regulations to require that defense industry companies must utilize specific security measures or face a penalty for failing to do so. Such regulation could require defense companies to implement more robust security pro- grams with updated security software. This is a less effective solution as the advancement in cyberattack technology increases so rapidly, and reformed regulations will likely be outdated as soon as they are implemented. It makes more sense to require that defense companies must implement the most updated software and programs determined by government security experts and cyber-security experts. Also, by allowing defense companies to decide which security companies it will work with, the defense companies obtain the option to shop for the best and most expensive program, or the company could choose the cheapest option, resulting in less efficient security. Cybersecurity regulations that are too specific run the risk of being outdated quickly, whereas broad requirements leave the option for companies to implement the lowest of security measures. Even if the government declines these suggested measures, defense industry companies should make the protection of their sensitive in- formation and encrypted items top priority. This method would re- quire complete buy-in from the senior management within the company and a thorough flow-down of cultural beliefs among its employees. A change in norms must be implemented, and defense industry personnel should be inundated with reminders on the importance of information security. Companies should provide employees with easy access to guidance, training, and assistance in handling, sharing, protecting, and exporting sensitive and export controlled information. Changing company culture takes time, and failure to change personnel beliefs will result in a lack of understanding and potential violations of export control regulations. In the worst cases, data spills and cyberattacks could result in the loss of sensitive or even classified in- formation that could jeopardize national security. Huge unauthorized data releases of sensitive information will negatively affect a company’s reputation thus affecting its ability to generate revenue. The risks in using and exporting encryption technology and sensitive information should be a major concern for defense industry companies. This concern should motivate the government to invest significant resources into compliance programs. Resources such as dedicated and qualified personnel can create policy and procedure to ensure compliance with United States government regulations, and the procedures will provide guidance and training to all employees. In addition, companies should employ IT security, data security, and counterintelligence personnel to work with the compliance team in innovating preventive measures and in addressing any potential data releases and export violations. Immediate actions and counter measures should be prioritized not just among the compliance and security teams but should be a known, expected response from all employees. In other words, cybersecurity norms should be instilled company-wide and thoroughly policed from within the company. How a company chooses to implement such measures remains discretionary, but a better resourced compliance department dedicated to implementing effective policies and responding quickly to potential issues will prevent export control violations and data releases of important information. Defense industry companies transfer export controlle
- Research Article
15
- 10.1163/18750230-31010007
- Mar 1, 2021
- Security and Human Rights
Export controls are domestic trade restrictions placed on technologies that have been determined to be important to the national security concerns of a country. In recent years, the policy purpose for maintaining export control regulations have shifted, and how these new export control regulations would interact with new emerging technologies is something that should be analyzed and considered. The passage of the United States (US) Export Control Reform Act (ecra) of 2018 and the proposed regulatory changes for the European Union’s (EU) Council Regulation (ec) No. 428/2009 have shifted the focus of dual-use export controls so that the national security goals of these controls have broadened to include economic security and human rights concerns. This paper argues that the infusion of geoeconomics into US national security considerations and the proposed expansion to include human rights considerations into EU export control regulations are made mutually exclusive of each other and were not made to expand the reach of export controls in a unifying way. Rather, the purpose and structural change to export control regulations serves to create more regulatory barriers on the trade of emerging technology industries that would not only impact the US and the EU, but also their international trading partners.
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1
- 10.26794/2220-6469-2022-16-4-67-78
- Jan 17, 2023
- The world of new economy
The study’s aim is to identify the features of interaction between state structures and companies of the military-industrial complex (DIC) in the course of diversification. Many scientific papers devoted to various aspects of this process show the need for its comprehensive study. Russian publications comment on certain aspects of these interactions. However, the approaches and initiatives of the dominant corporations of the military-industrial complex to carry out diversification, being supported by the state, have not yet fallen on the radar of analysis. The author focuses on solving the problem of removing institutional barriers that hinder the scale and direction of diversification. Also, the study updates new solutions for an active policy of stimulating and expanding the production of civilian products. The author identifies the specifics and advantages of unconventional methods in defense companies. The methodological basis of the work is an institutional approach using a structural and logical analysis. The author highlighted the research methods for using of systematization, grouping, comparative analysis. The paper reflects the results of monitoring relevant approaches to implementing the diversification strategy in state defense corporations. The research showed that it has to increase the share of civilian production for the successful implementation of plans as well as to change the fiscal model for the development of the defense industry to an investment-motivational one. The findings and results obtained indicated scientific novelty and may interest in leading defense companies in order to adjust their strategies, as well as to state agencies in the formation of state policy in defense industry diversification.
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1
- 10.1016/j.procir.2024.04.019
- Jan 1, 2024
- Procedia CIRP
An obsolescence management framework for a defense industry company
- Research Article
- 10.57235/jetish.v2i1.351
- Mar 19, 2023
- JETISH: Journal of Education Technology Information Social Sciences and Health
An independent and strong defense industry can support the development of defense forces and the economy. Where in reviewing its development can be seen through its financial aspects or the company's financial performance. Assessment of financial performance can be seen from the level of profit or profitability that has been achieved by the company in carrying out its operational activities. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of business risk and sales growth on the financial performance of defense industry companies in Indonesia for the 2011-2020 period. This research is a quantitative research with a sample focused on 5 defense industry companies which are members of DEFEND ID. The analysis used is multiple linear regression. The results showed that partially business risk has an effect on financial performance while sales growth has no effect on financial performance. Meanwhile, business risk and sales growth simultaneously affect the company's performance, with a coefficient of determination of 89.4%.
- Research Article
- 10.16980/jitc.17.5.202110.577
- Oct 30, 2021
- Korea International Trade Research Institute
Purpose - This paper analyzes how the US export control policy affects South Korea’s export control system and why the Korean system should follow the multilateral regimes. Design/methodology/approach - We used the data of researches, reports, papers and books about US and South Korea export control policies and regulations. First, we analyse how the US export control policy affected East Asian countries and international system. Through the case of the United States, the export control policy is operated for the purpose of promoting its own national interests, international non-proliferation order and South Korea’s export control adoption are one of outcomes. Findings - As a result of historical review of US export control policies, it have extended its non-proliferation export control into the international regimes. South Korea s export regime initially followed the international norms, but was heavily influenced by the externals. South Korea’s system was overly influenced by the United States’ compared to the initial design of the control syste Research Implications or Originality - Considering the findings of this study, International regimes provide standards of Export Control System on strategic items since they are the agreements from the member states of multilateral regimes.
- Research Article
- 10.23977/law.2023.020103
- Jan 1, 2023
- Science of Law Journal
On June 11, 2021, the EU issued the revised Regulation on Control of Dual-Use Items Export (EU 2021/821, hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation") in its official gazette. The Regulation came into force on September 9, 2021, and replaced the EU's existing export control laws and regulations, which were introduced in 2009. Compared with the revised proposal of the Regulation issued by the European Commission for the first time in 2016, the newly revised Regulation has made certain adjustments in the scope of control, further reflecting the competition and consideration between EU member states and the European Commission on the specific scope of control and measures when revising the Regulation. Through the introduction of the main structure and content of the newly revised Regulations and interpretation of the newly revised contents that deserve attention in the Regulations, this paper compares the Regulations with the export control rules of China and the United States, and finally provides reference suggestions for compliance.
- Research Article
- 10.31851/jmksp.v8i1.11074
- Feb 4, 2023
- JMKSP (Jurnal Manajemen, Kepemimpinan, dan Supervisi Pendidikan)
This research focused on three defense industry companies, namely PT Dirgantara Indonesia, PT PAL Indonesia (Persero) and PT Pindad (Persero). This study used a quantitative research approach with a time period from 2011 to 2020. The results of the study show that the magnitude of the effect of efficiency and asset growth on financial performance in the defense industry sector is 45.0% and the remaining 55.0% is explained by other variables not examined in this study. Efficiency and Asset Growth have a simultaneous effect on Financial Performance in the Defense Industry Sector. Efficiency partially has a positive effect on Financial Performance in the Defense Industry Sector. Asset Growth partially does not affect Financial Performance in the Defense Industry Sector. This can be a concern for companies in the defense industry sector so that Indonesia can create a strong, independent and competitive defense industry. Keywords: Efficiency, Global, Financial Performance, Asset Growth, Technology
- Research Article
1
- 10.36543/kauiibfd.2023.021
- Jun 26, 2023
- Kafkas Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi
The aim of this study is to analyze and evaluate the feasibility of blockchain technology in the management of technology investments in the national defense industry. Blockchain technology (BT) has the potential to provide an important tool and infrastructure in providing technical cooperation and partnerships between national defense technology companies and institutions. It is predicted that BT shall become widespread in the field of defense industry and its cost shall decrease over time. Data sending and assessment of trust in the collaborative ambiance are seen as important problem areas in the use of blockchain technology by defense industry companies. In order to use blockchain technologies effectively in Turkey’s move of national defense industry, legal foundations, and platforms should be established and a state strategy should be formed in this regard.
- Research Article
- 10.1007/s42423-020-00066-x
- Dec 1, 2020
- Advances in Astronautics Science and Technology
The sustainability of Outer Space in a context of increased human activity in low Earth orbit (“LEO”) has been much debated lately. The discussion focuses on how space debris appears, how they can be limited and, possibly, removed. Commercial proposals for Active Debris Removal (ADR) and providing life-extension services to satellites are slowly emerging as precursory technological tools. Those technologies will involve so-called on-orbit servicing activities (“OOS”), i.e., activities performed on a spacecraft, while it is in or near its operational orbit and will require that one spacecraft approach, rendezvous, and interact with the asset/the debris to be removed; they raise a host of legal, regulatory, and policy challenges that need to be discussed as those projects progressively mature. Those cutting-edge technologies have potent capabilities and a potential for military and missile technology applications. As a result, they will likely be controlled by export control regulations (possibly by US export control regulation) and might fall under the stringent ITAR requirements. OOS inevitably involves the coupling of two different actors, the servicing spacecraft performing the services, and the asset to service. From an export control perspective, depending on the circumstances of each mission, in particular on the nationality of the servicing spacecraft and the one of the debris, the exchange of information between them might qualify as an export of technical data and would need to be licensed and authorized accordingly. In addition, because of the coupling of those two actors, the OOS model presents an inherent complexity: it creates a greater risk of technical failures, in particular of on-orbit collisions. As a consequence, it can induce more opportunities to exchange technical data in a context of urgency that prompts omissions and ultimately, more opportunities for violating export controls. This would apply even if technical data are exchanged for insurance or investigation purposes. Thus, any situation of on-orbit failure in the context of an OOS presents a risk of inadvertent export control. In the past, inadequately managed launch-failure investigations of satellites launched on non-US launchers caused major export control violations and were to have a profound impact on the US export control system. After observing how technological measures can mitigate risks of export control violations, this paper will propose a normative suggestion to mitigate potential ITAR violations and to avoid inadvertent export control situations in case of on-orbit failures in the context of OOS.
- Research Article
- 10.54254/2753-7048/27/20231238
- Dec 7, 2023
- Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media
The United States has established a number of export control regulations within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have somewhat impacted Chinas exports. An major issue faced by China is how to employ legal tactics to counteract US export prohibitions. This study will examine Chinas current legislative framework and assess US export control laws within the context of the WTO. Targeted countermeasures will be recommended to satisfy Chinas legal obligations for dealing with US export controls under the WTO framework through the lens of issues and improvements. This study examines the issues with the current legal tactics and looks for potential solutions by analyzing pertinent domestic and international literature, laws, and regulations in combination with real-world case studies for comparison and summarizing. The study comes to the conclusion that Chinas legal defenses against US export controls inside the WTO framework have certain flaws. For instance, in order to properly respond to US export regulations, China needs to significantly develop its legal system. In addition, China should strengthen cooperation with other member countries to jointly face the challenges of US export controls. In response to these problems, this article puts forward some policy suggestions, including improving relevant laws and regulations, strengthening cooperation with other member countries, actively participating in the work of international organizations to protect Chinas export interests. At the same time, this article also recognizes that these strategies are only preliminary explorations, and further research and practical exploration are still needed in the future. In the field of international trade, China should continuously adapt to changes, strengthen the construction of its own legal system, and promote the development of China.
- Book Chapter
- 10.53478/tuba.978-625-8352-17-7.ch23
- Dec 15, 2022
Türkiye encountered the first embargo targeting the defense industry during the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. The applied arms embargo has revealed the importance of independence and national production in the supply of defense technologies and the satisfaction of military communication needs in Türkiye more than ever before. As a result of the lessons learned and negative experiences received after the operation, ASELSAN was established to meet the needs of military communications and electronics without depending on any country under the leadership of the Ground Forces Strengthening Foundation to support the domestic and national defense industry. ASELSAN has reached a global size with its original designs developed, more than nine thousand employees as of 2021, companies in which it has shares at home and abroad, thousands of square meters of campuses and exports to 78 countries within 46 years. The sanctions of the countries against Türkiye have continued in the recent past. It is aimed that the sanctions imposed will have an impact on the Turkish defense industry on the basis of systems, subsystems, components, especially in critical technologies. As a result of the sanctions, many countries and companies around the world have acted contrary to contracts in their relations with Turkish defense industry institutions and companies. ASELSAN represents Türkiye in the world with independent defense technologies on many platforms and systems today with its nationalization activities in order to reduce external dependence and supply risks in the defense industry, and it can offer many products that cannot be obtained from outside due to embargoes to its users. ASELSAN carries out nationalization activities in order to increase the proportion of domestic materials in its systems in order to reduce external dependence and supply risks in the defense industry. ASELSAN has reached the level that developed countries in the defense industry, where technology is kept under strict control between countries, have reached with intensive work within a century, within a few decades.
- Research Article
- 10.20542/0131-2227-2025-69-5-66-76
- Jan 1, 2025
- World Economy and International Relations
Since the beginning of World War II, Canada and the United States have engaged in intensive defense industrial cooperation that has resulted in the integration of their defense industries. The official term used for explaining this phenomenon is a North American defense industrial base. The driving force behind this integration were the top U.S. defense companies, which opened their numerous branches and subsidiaries in Canada, and took command positions in the Canadian defense industry. The U.S.-Canadian defense industrial relationship has been incrementally institutionalized in several framework agreements. In 1956 and 1963, the United States and Canada entered into the Defense Production Sharing Agreement, and the Defense Development Sharing Agreement. Additionally, in 1993, the United States has designated Canada as part of the U.S. defense industrial base. Canada is unique among U.S. allies in that it is both a leading purchaser of major U.S. weapon systems and a key supplier of subsystems, components, and materials to the U.S. defense industry. Because of the high level of integration between the two economies at the sub-tier level, as well as the flow of goods between parent companies and subsidiaries, there is a much higher level of cross-border trade in parts and components between the U.S. and Canadian defense firms than the official SIPRI defense-trade statistics suggest. This article surveys the peculiarities of the Canadian defense industry, its contribution to the North American defense industrial base, the history of Canada-U.S. defense industrial cooperation, the division of labor in North America in the field of arms production, Canadian industrial capabilities, as well as the volume and dynamics of arms trade between two countries.
- Conference Article
1
- 10.1109/icte47868.2020.9215542
- Sep 1, 2020
Innovation is crucial for countries to accelerate the development. Especially for emerging countries, it is much more valuable in terms of catching and crossing the countries with higher levels of development. HAVELSAN is a large-scale software defense company that adopted the open innovation concept firstly among the other defense industry companies in Turkey. Training and Simulation Technologies division is one of the most innovative and creative groups that lead on the countless projects on the military domain. This division, adopted innovation entirely, has started to develop numerous of products with innovative ideas. Although innovation is one of the most important elements for digitalization, it alone is not enough to get positive results. Implementation of innovation with the right business model is vital to ensure success. HAVELSAN determined its business models in the past with the requirements of military sector, which was the targeted for the company to serve the products. Therefore, this causes current business models used in the company are lacking in providing the products realized with innovation to the market and enabling them to succeed. The products could be served in different sectors, so there was a need to review current business models that the company used and add new ones in order to enable to meet the requirements of the business model innovation in new technologies. Therefore, the roadmap was determined and the listed steps were completed; firstly, the current used models, which had deficiencies taking places in the market successfully, used in the company were reviewed. Then, the new business model innovation is decided; which lead company to reach the new markets successfully. Lastly, the new business models applied to the products and these successful models are disseminated throughout the company. In this article, this process will be explained.
- Book Chapter
- 10.1007/978-3-319-95174-4_11
- Jan 1, 2018
The Korean government enacted the Defense Industrial Technology Security Act in 2015 and announced the list of defense industrial technologies to be protected for national security. Accordingly, defense industry companies should establish the defense technology protection system and protect the defense industrial technology information designated by law. Currently the Korean government is trying to develop the classification system of defense scientific and technical information. In this paper, we study a classification system of defense scientific and technical information. To do this, we analyze the directives currently operated by the Ministry of National Defense of Korea and the classification system of scientific and technical information of the US Department of Defense. Then, we propose a classification system which is based on Korean system and adopts the US system to supplement the shortcomings.
- Research Article
- 10.52798/kadis.2020.27.1.7
- Jun 30, 2020
- Journal of the Korean Association of Defense Industry Studies
Securing the ability of defense industry exporters to smoothly implement off-set is an important factor directly linked to the promotion of exports. Recently, however, Korean defense industry exporters have been having difficulty fulfilling their export off-set obligations after the contracts. Export off-set is an duty of exporters, but policy support is needed. Among the government-level support measures, the swap system can be substantial and strong support from the perspective of defense industry exporters. However, because of differences in institutions, laws, etc. between countries, the value of the off-set that need to be implemented between them may result in 'equivalence' problems that may not be equal in the value of the off-set that are set off in each country. The purpose of this study is to find out the problems of each type of swap with these problems and to propose the corresponding measures for calculating the value of the off-set to prepare the criteria for future swap negotiations. Considering that the scale of the swap is determined by negotiations with the other country, however, the priority of the negotiations should be considered in various ways, including relations with the other country and the security situation at the time of the negotiations. Therefore, we hope that the measures proposed by this study will lead to the readjustment of the swap system, which will soon lead to the improvement of export competitiveness of the nation's defense industry companies.
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