Abstract

Abstract : Two alternative nonproliferation precedents were set in 2003: in Iraq, a change of regime; in Libya, a change in a regime. In March, U.S. and British military forces invaded Iraq to coercively disarm that country of its presumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles. In December, only eight months after the fall of Baghdad, the British and U.S. governments jointly announced the starling revelation that secret negotiations had yielded a commitment by Libyan leader Mohammar Qaddafi to verifiably relinquish his country's covert WMD capabilities. President Bush stated that by this commitment to conform to international nonproliferation norms, Libya had begun the process of rejoining the con%community of nations. Administration officials were quick to link the Libyan development to the Iraq war, arguing that the decisive use of force to topple the Saddam Hussein regime had precipitated Qaddafi's decision, while former Clinton administration officials claimed that it was the culmination of a decade-long process. The current nuclear crisis with Iran is playing out against the backdrop of these twill precedents. What are the lessons and implications of these precedent-setting experiences for the development of effective nonproliferation strategies? The stakes are high as experts now posit that the international system now faces the specter of a tipping point in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one additional state, such as Iran, could trigger a proliferation epidemic as other states reconsider their nuclear restraint.

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