Abstract

This study explores the relationship between municipal reform structures and group politics from a theoretical perspective new to the reform literature, one based on opportunity theory. Government structures are hypothesized to shape chief executives' strategies for remaining in office or advancing. Specifically, reform government structures tend to make the chief executive's appointment/reelection more vulnerable to the influence of a broader array of interest groups than do unreformed government structures. Therefore, chief executives of reformed govrnments will perceive a more diverse range of groups and interests as influential than will executives of unreformed governments. This hypothesis is found to be consistent with an analysis of a nationwide survey of American cities 50,000 and over in population. The findings also point out limitations in the socioeconomic, party, and reform ideology models more commonly offered to explain the reform structures-group politics relationship. Finally, this study presents a revised interpretation of the traditional notion that reform structures have a middle-class and business bias.

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