Changing the Form of County Government: Effects on Revenue and Expenditure Policy

Abstract

The past few decades have brought an enormous increase in county government reorganization. Even though the traditional form of commission government is still most prevalent, over 1,100 counties across the country now operate under some version of an appointed administrator or elected chief executive form of government (Jeffery, et al., 1989, 120). In 1960, only about 83 counties had such chief executives (Governmental Research Institute, 1980, 12). Most of these so-called reform counties are populous enough that a majority of Americans now live in reorganized counties. Yet almost nothing is known in any comparative or systematic sense about the consequences of this far-reaching change in local government structure. Perhaps 30 years ago this lack of knowledge might have been understandable. But today, many counties enjoy a large measure of governmental autonomy, and urban counties in particular have taken on a wide range of optional services previously reserved to city governments. A sizable literature has analyzed the effects of the urban reform movement on city governments, but we have little understanding of the policy consequences of changes in governmental structure among American counties. A frequently tested hypothesis in the urban policy literature is that reform governments should tax and spend less than nonreformed municipalities. Yet, the results of such research have been mixed. As discussed below, some studies confirm the basic thesis that reformers were largely successful in immunizing city government from the big spending preferences of lower-income ethnic and minority voters. Others find that changing the form of municipal government has little if any effect on taxing and spending policy. Regardless of the lack of definitive findings in the urban policy literature, we should profit from a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the policy impact of reform at the city level. We will follow that discussion with a consideration of some of the special characteristics of counties that might cause them to behave differently from municipal jurisdictions under conditions of reorganization. To assess the effects of a change in county structure, we employ an interrupted time-series design. Our analysis covers the period from 1974 to 1992. It will include 10 counties that changed their form and 10 control counties that have operated continuously under the commission form. Can County Modernization Affect Public Policy? The literature in urban politics has long suggested that the form of city government should have policy consequences. Soon after the turn of the century, the good government movement sought various ways to free the nation's large cities from the clutches of corrupt political machines. In addition to eliminating graft and corruption, the reformers sought local governments that were efficient, businesslike, and more responsive to the popular will. To accomplish these goals, reform groups promoted such institutional devices as the civil service, non-partisan ballots, at-large elections, and the city manager form of government. Implementing civil service and creating new electoral arrangements (including the direct primary and the initiative and referendum) represented the main assault on machine rule and its dishonest practices. But for greater economy, efficiency, and rational decision making, reformers eventually embraced the council-manager plan. The municipal reform movement quickly picked up substantial support from the business and professional community. In fact, some observers contended that the underlying purpose of the reform agenda was to foster a local government commitment to efficiency and scientific management that would help promote a climate for private profit-making (Judd, 1988, 108). Not coincidentally, an emphasis on businesslike practices and efficient service delivery would also presumably deflect the objectives of particularistic interests. …