Abstract
Packages for the transport of radioactive material have to comply with national and/or international regulations. These regulations are widely based on the requirements set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material'. In this framework, packages to transport fuel assemblies (including spent fuel assemblies) have to meet the requirements for packages containing fissile material. In accident conditions of transport, the applicant for the package design approval has to show that the package remains subcritical taking due account of the status of the contents in these conditions. In most cases, considering water ingress in the package, it is not possible to assume that the fissile material included in the fuel assemblies is dispersed in the package with the most severe conceivable distribution regarding criticality. In order to alleviate this difficulty, during the last years, we have provided a significant better knowledge of the conditions of the fuel assemblies to be transported. This was part of the Fuel Integrity Project, whose progress was regularly reported during PATRAM 2001 and PATRAM 2004 Symposia. However, for packages which encounter a large g-load during accident conditions of transport and/or which contain spent fuel assemblies with very high burn-up, it can be difficult to demonstrate that the fuel assemblies are not significantly damaged. Then, to make the criticality assessment considering water inleakage into the flask and a large release of fissile material within its cavity will not allow meeting the subcriticality criteria. For that reason, for our package designs, which use a gas and not water as an internal coolant and which fall into that category, the author has decided to take credit of the possibilities provided by the subparagraph 677 (b) of the Regulations. This paragraph allows not taking into account water in the package, provided that the package exhibits 'multiple high standard water barriers'. The paper describes the author's experience with the implementation of this paragraph. Two different cases are considered: either a double vessel, or a double lid. It will be explained when each of these solutions is implemented, and give examples of package designs with such features, as well as the approvals which were granted for these designs in various countries.
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