Abstract
We develop a theory of non-interference for multilevel security based on causality, with Petri nets as a reference model. We first focus on transitive non-interference, where the relation representing the admitted flow is transitive. Then we extend the approach to intransitive non-interference, where the transitivity assumption is dismissed, leading to a framework which is suited to model a controlled disclosure of information. Efficient verification algorithms based on the unfolding semantics of Petri nets stem out of the theory. We also argue about the possibility of performing a compositional verification.
Highlights
Starting with [1], the notion of non-interference has been widely used in the study of information flow security
Generalizing [11] we treat the intransitive case, namely we develop a multilevel theory for BINI [6], an adaptation of based Non-Deducibility on Composition (BNDC) to intransitive domains
After introducing multilevel security domains, we review some basic notions about Petri nets, with special attention to their unfolding semantics, later used to provide a causal characterization of the non-interference properties
Summary
Starting with [1], the notion of non-interference has been widely used in the study of information flow security. The behavior of the High part of the system is required not to cause any modification in the behavior of the Low part This informal reference to causality is made formal in [7] that, relying on some previous work [5], provides a causal characterization of BNDC (Bisimulationbased NDC) on Petri nets, in terms of the unfolding semantics [10]. In this paper the approach of [7], providing a causal characterization of the BNDC (Bisimulation-based NDC) property for (safe) Petri nets based on the unfolding semantics, is extended to deal with multilevel transitive policies.
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