Multi-agent collaborative management of coastal pollution from land-based sources from the perspective of emissions trading: An evolutionary game theory approach

Abstract

Emissions trading has been playing a very important role in addressing pollution of estuarine and coastal waters. This paper aims to explain mechanism of the multi-agent collaborative management of coastal pollution from land-based sources from the perspective of emissions trading and identify its influencing factors. Given the current participation of polluting enterprises in emissions trading, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public. Drawing on this model and the ABM (agent-based modeling) for simulation and using artificial neural networks for error corrections, the numerical simulation of the data of Dongying, a pilot city of emissions trading is conducted, to examine the influence of different factors on the evolutionarily stable strategy. The results show that: ➀ increasing each agent’s initial willingness of participating in collaborative management can facilitate the evolution of their behavioral strategies towards collaborative management. Specifically, compared with the public, polluter’s stronger willingness for emission reduction and the government’s more proactive willingness for regulation can better promote collaborative management in land-based pollution; ➁ the increase in the reward standard for emissions cutters has a positive impact on enterprises and the public’s proactive participation in collaborative management, yet a negative impact on local governments; ➂ higher reward from the provincial government and the increase in the emissions trading price have a positive impact on the enthusiasm of local governments, enterprises and the public in collaborative management; ➃ the increase in the unit cost of emission reduction will undermine polluting enterprises’ enthusiasm in emission reduction. Policy suggestions are thus proposed, such as increasing the subsidies for emission reduction, promoting and perfecting the emission trading market, cutting the emission reduction cost of enterprises and the supervision cost of local governments, and increasing the public’s concern on the governance of marine pollution from land-based sources. The conclusion will provide a theoretical underpinning for and guide related practice of future preservation of coastal ecologies and management of coastal pollution from land-based sources.