Multi-round auction-based resource allocation for edge computing: Maximizing social welfare

Abstract

5G NR-Lite technology still suffers from inadequate response to low latency, high speed and mass connectivity scenarios in high mobility conditions. Building on 4G and 5G, 6G networks will work to more fully enable the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, working to provide secure wireless computing for the digital world. In order to ensure the resource utilization of edge computing, it is usually necessary to allocate resources among mobile devices. Many scholars have applied auction theory to resource allocation in mobile edge networks and achieved specific results in recent years. However, most existing studies unilaterally consider the utility of users or edge servers, and few jointly consider social welfare and user selection priorities, which cannot maximize the overall utility of mobile edge networks. This paper proposes a multi-round auction algorithm that pursues maximizing social welfare in a multi-user–multi-server network. The algorithm combines combinatorial auction with double auction, allowing users and servers to adjust their bids and asking prices in each auction round. To enhance the generalizability of the study, the algorithm takes full advantage of the flexibility of the auction mechanism and considers the users’ demand for different servers, the variability of bidding strategies, and the variability of the total resources of edge servers so that the users can obtain resources with higher priority and improve social welfare. To ensure that social welfare is maximized, we adopt the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) payment mechanism and consider the effect of network externalities. Extensive comparative experiments show that the algorithm can effectively improve social welfare and maximize the overall benefits of the mobile edge network.