Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach

Abstract

With the growing demand for massive access and data transmission requests, terrestrial communication systems are inefficient in providing satisfactory services. Compared with terrestrial communication networks, satellite communication networks have the advantages of wide coverage and support for massive access services. Satellite–terrestrial integrated networks are indispensable parts of future B5G/6G networks. Challenges arise for implementing and operating a successful satellite–terrestrial integrated network, including differentiated user requirements, infrastructure compatibility, limited resource constraints, and service provider incentives. In order to support diversified services, a multi-domain network slicing approach is proposed in this study, in which network resources from both terrestrial and satellite networks are combined to build alternative routes when serving the same slice request as virtual private networks. To improve the utilization efficiency of limited resources, slice admission control is formulated as a mechanism design problem. To encourage participation and cooperation among different service providers, a multi-sided ascending-price auction mechanism is further proposed as a game theory-based solution for slice admission control and resource allocation, in which multiple strategic service providers maximize their own utilities by trading bandwidth resources. The proposed auction mechanism is proven to be strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and obviously truthful. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, real-world historical traffic data are used in the simulation experiments and the results show that the proposed approach is asymptotically optimal with the increase in users and competitive with the polynomial-time optimal trade mechanism, in terms of admission ratio and service provider profit.