Abstract
In this study, we examine whether the unique institutional position of the chief justice and the concomitant opportunities afforded its occupants to influence the Court's decision-making affect the behavior of individuals who are promoted to the center chair. We theorize that incumbents of that office will change their behavior systematically so as to advance their broad set of goals, notably including protecting the Court's institutional cohesiveness and legitimacy. Using data that cover more than a century of Supreme Court history (1894-1996), we examine whether the chief justice will concur and dissent less frequently, write fewer individual opinions, and moderate his policy views so as to attain those goals. We find that the chief justice's place within the decisional structure of the Court, in part, serves to create an incentive structure that is associated with a systematic decrease in the number of concurring and dissenting votes cast and separate opinions written. Our results also imply that the office of the chief justice is associated with more moderate expressions of policy goals in economics and civil liberties-civil rights decision-making, the bulk of the Court's agenda during the period of analysis.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call