Abstract
ABSTRACT Since 2009, the Nigerian military has engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram and other extremists groups in Northern Nigeria, making extensive use of airpower. In such operations, the seeming casual and indiscriminate airstrikes have produced unfortunate scale of collateral damage to both civilians and its own personnel. This paper examines Nigeria’s recurring mis-targeted airstrikes against the backdrop of the country’s protracted and problematic COIN operations. The paper argues that such incidents are not necessarily ’a mistake’ or ‘a mishap’, but a reflection of the limitations of airpower capabilities. Going forward, Nigeria’s endeavours at countering insurgency and allied threats need to be systematically repositioned in a manner that guarantees optimal operational efficiency and precision. This requires improvements in combat techniques and technology as well as in command and intelligence capabilities of the forces.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
