More than Decorative, Less than Decisive: Russian A2/AD Capabilities and NATO

Abstract

Following the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, Western assessments of Russia’s military capabilities rapidly changed from ‘basket case’ to ‘menace’. In this pendulum swing, some estimates clearly overshot, especially concerning Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These were described as creating large no-go zones on NATO’s eastern flank that could be overcome only at high risk or with new, exotic and costly kit. This impression could reinforce perceptions that the eastern allies could not be defended. This article argues that technical limitations, a wide range of possible countermeasures and experiences from air operations in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh together suggest a less alarmist assessment of Russian A2/AD capabilities. But the threat should not be underestimated, and expanded NATO area-access assets are needed, as Russia will continuously improve its capabilities and the status quo is fluid.